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ABSTRACT
Two opposing paradigms, analyses via frequentist or Bayesian methods, dominate the
statistical literature. Most commonly, frequentist approaches have been used to design and analyze
clinical trials, though Bayesian techniques are becoming increasingly popular. However, these two
paradigms can generate divergent results even in analyses of the same trial data, which may harm
the scientific interpretability of the trial. Therefore, it is crucial to harmonize analyses under each
approach. In this dissertation, novel unified approaches for one-sided frequentist and Bayesian
hypothesis testing problems comparing two proportions in fixed-sample and group-sequential
clinical trials are proposed. When a frequentist design with desired type I and II error rates are
given, the unification is achieved by deriving specific Bayesian decision thresholds and sample
sizes. Similarly, when a Bayesian design is given, the unification is achieved by deriving
corresponding frequentist characteristics. In addition, theoretical methods to determine the
Bayesian decision threshold, sample size and power are provided. Numerical results show that the
unified approach can yield the same type I and II error rates for frequentist and Bayesian hypothesis
tests through a numerical study. Further, detailed evaluations suggest that Bayesian priors
specifications, allocation ratios, number of analyses can affect the resulting Bayesian sample sizes
and decision thresholds. Overall, the unified approach can be adopted into the current clinical trial
setting and is helpful to make trial results translatable between frequentist and Bayesian methods.
Keywords: clinical trials, Bayesian design, frequentist design, hypothesis testing, unification,
sample size calculation
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Frequentist and Bayesian approaches are two opposing paradigms commonly used in statistical
inferences. The root of the disagreement between these two approaches lies in their fundamental
philosophies. For example, in a clinical trial, clinical trialists are interested in finding the
probability of success for a new treatment (i.e, the treatment effect). Frequentist methods, or called
the classical methods, consider the treatment on each patient as an independent experiment and
repeat the experiment for multiple times by enrolling a number of patients. The average success
rate of multiple experiments approximates the true value of the probability of success for the new
treatment.
In contrast, Bayesian approaches consider the probability of success as an uncertain
quantity and associate the treatment effect with a probability distribution at the beginning of the
trial. Those probability distributions are called prior distributions, as they often represent a priori
knowledge about the effect the new treatment would have. When clinical trial data is collected,
Bayesian methods update the probability distribution for treatment effect with evidence observed
from the data. The evidence is also called the data likelihood, which represents the amount of
information provided by data on the treatment effect. The updated probability distribution is
referred to as the posterior distribution.
The fundamental disagreement between frequentist and Bayesian paradigms has led to a
philosophical debate on which paradigm is superior for decades. Although it is mentioned in many
publications, that frequentist approaches have dominated the statistical analysis since the early 20th
century (Feigelson, Loredo, & Building, 1992; Greenland, 2006; Gupta, 2012; Kass, 2011; J. J.
Lee & Chu, 2012). The early popularity of frequentist methods is largely due to frequentist
7

probability calculations do not involve many computations, whereas Bayesian methods can have
complicated calculations and often demand computer powers that are unattainable in early days (J.
J. Lee & Chu, 2012). To be more specific, frequentist probability calculations usually have closedform solutions that allow quickly being computed, whereas Bayesian probability calculations only
have closed-form solution under certain assumptions (e.g. the conjugate priors, for which the prior
and the posterior distribution follows the same family of distribution). In addition, Bayesian
methods can have hierarchical structures, which introduce uncertainty to parameters of the prior
distribution. As a result, Bayesian probability calculations can be computationally intensive.
In clinical trials, frequentist methods have been the dominant paradigm since the first
modern trial carried out in the 1940s (Gupta, 2012; J. J. Lee & Chu, 2012). Over the past decades,
the medical community and regulatory agencies have adopted frequentist approaches as the testing
standard in clinical trials (Teira, 2011). However, recent computational advance in software and
computational power (e.g. Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo and WinBUGS) greatly facilitate the use
of Bayesian techniques in statistical design and analysis including clinical trials. Formal
acceptance from by the regulatory agencies (FDA, 2014; ICH, 2017) and well established
Bayesian standard methods (S. M. Berry, Carlin, Lee, & Muller, 2010) also help popularize
Bayesian methods in clinical trials.
There are several purported advantages of using Bayesian approaches in clinical trials. First,
Bayesian results are more related to clinician's question than frequentist results. For example, a
clinician may ask, ‘How likely is that our experimental treatment to be better than the control?’,
or ‘What is the probability of our null hypothesis to be true?’. Frequentist statisticians draw
conclusions for the hypothesis test based upon the significance test and the p-value. However, pvalues are not intuitive and are often misinterpreted as the probability of the null hypothesis to be
8

true by clinicians (Cohen, 2011; Goodman, 2008). In fact, the p-value should be interpreted as the
probability of obtaining a treatment effect at least as extreme as the observed effect when the null
hypothesis is true. Therefore, the p-value essentially is not answering the clinician’s questions.
In contrast, Bayesian methods allow to directly assign a probability distribution to the null
hypothesis or a statement such as the experimental arm is superior to the control arm(D. A. Berry,
2006). Thus, the definition of Bayesian probability is more intuitive in comparison with the
frequentist definition of probability. Furthermore, The subsequent Bayesian updating and decision
making is also an inherently sequential process (Bayarri & Berger, 2004). In addition, Bayesian
methods enable to incorporate prior information for assessing treatment effects in clinical trials.
Historical data from previous trials in a similar setting can provide valuable information and
possibly reduce the sample size for clinical trials. For instance, Laptook et al. (2017) used a
Bayesian analysis of the treatment effect of hypothermia in infants with hypoxic-ischemic
encephalopathy (HIE). Because of the limited number of infants expected to enroll in their clinical
trial, it is difficult to conduct a traditional statistical significance test. To resolve this problem, the
authors incorporated historical data to yield a quantitative summary of the trial results.
Nevertheless, there are controversial opinions about the use of Bayesian priors. On the
other hand, Fayers et al. (1997) had made justifications for the use of prior in Bayesian approaches.
The authors suggested that a pessimistic prior can reduce possibilities to wrongly draw a
conclusion that there is overwhelm treatment effect. As such, an optimistic prior can lower the
chances that an effective treatment is early terminated for futility. On the other hand, some clinical
trialists are concerned with choosing appropriate prior distributions as selecting a prior can be
subjective and biased (J. J. Lee & Chu, 2012). This is because clinical trialists often determine the
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prior distribution based on their own knowledge about a treatment effect. As a result, people may
end up using different priors on the same dataset and draw different conclusions.
Discordance between conclusions makes trial results hard to interpret. Irony (2008) also
found that the Bayesian inference was very sensitive to the prior variance addressing the crossvariability of historical studies. If there is only one historical study, clinical trialists cannot
precisely estimate the variance. Consequently, the prior information may lead to wrong posterior
inference and decisions. Regulatory agencies, therefore, preclude the use of informative priors
when there is not enough historical data (Teira, 2011).
Gönen (2009) and Grieve (2016) have also discussed problems with available software in
addition to prior selections. Lack of accessible user-friendly software can often discourage
biostatisticians to use Bayesian methods because it is impossible for biostatisticians to write
complex code every time to implement a Bayesian clinical trial design. Moreover, regulatory
authorities including the FDA often require frequentist concepts, such as type I and II error rates,
to be rigorously controlled (D. A. Berry, 2006; FDA, 2014). However, the type I and II error rates
are frequentist concepts and are not naturally considered Bayesian philosophies. This is because
that type I and II error rates measure probabilities of making wrong conclusions about the
hypotheses while Bayesian methods directly measure the probability of the hypothesis. Therefore,
many Bayesian designs are carried out without explicit consideration of frequentist characteristics.
Very often, clinical trialists have to perform simulations to adjust Bayesian tuning parameters to
satisfy the respective type I and II error rates. However, tuning those parameters can influence the
optimality of original Bayesian designs (Ventz & Trippa, 2014).
Another problem is frequentist and Bayesian methods may differ in conclusions. When
informative priors are used in Bayesian designs, clinical trialists may reach divergent conclusions
10

between Bayesian and frequentist inferences, even on the same data (FDA, 2014). The divergence
harms the scientific merit of a clinical trial, as conclusions should be consistent across analytic
methods. Consequently, there has been a long-time debate between frequentist and Bayesian
clinical trialists about which one is advantageous to the other (Efron, 2005; D J Spiegelhalter,
Freedman, & Parmar, 1994).
Thus, it is important to consider unifying Bayesian and frequentist methods in clinical trials.
Notably, statisticians have put a lot of effort to seek parallels between frequentist and Bayesian
methods. Several statisticians have reconciled or calibrated one of the methods to the other for data
analysis to reach the same conclusion. For instance, a prominent contribution is that Casella and
Berger (1989) showed adjusting priors in Bayesian approaches can lead to the same inference as
frequentist methods when analyzing data. However, such prior calibrations during the data analysis
are inappropriate for clinical trials. In clinical trials, the statistical analysis is well planned at the
design stage so it must be analyzed as planned during analysis. As such, many other methods of
unifying frequentist and Bayesian methods are not applicable to clinical trials because of adjusting
parameters during analysis. Therefore, it is crucial to consider the problem from the design stage
to unify frequentist and Bayesian methods in clinical trials.
Several biostatisticians have made contributions regarding harmonizing frequentist and
Bayesian methods at the design stage. Inoue, Berry, and Parmigiani (2005) considered unifying
frequentist and Bayesian methods at the design stage. The authors found a correspondence between
Bayesian and frequentist methods to generate the same sample size. However, the authors defined
a specific classification error for Bayesian hypothesis testing rather than using type I and II error
rates. The classification error makes it difficult to translate results between the frequentist and
Bayesian approaches.
11

More recently, Zhu et al. (2015) considered a simulation-based approach to introduce alpha
spending functions (DeMets & Lan, 1994; Lan & Demets, 1983) into Bayesian group sequential
trials. The authors showed that the overall type I error rate is controlled under multiple types of
alpha spending stopping boundaries. However, Zhu et al. required sample size to be pre-specified
for calculating stopping boundaries, which conflicted with most trial planning processes where the
sample size is determined once stopping boundaries are derived. Furthermore, the authors did not
consider conditional distributions of posterior probabilities of multiple analyses, nor varying
futility boundaries, which were often found in realistic group-sequential trials.
Shi and Yin (2019) proposed another method to control type I error rate in single boundary
Bayesian group sequential trials. The method reduced the computation burden required by
simulations and maintained the desired type I error rate. However, the authors did not consider
stopping the trial for futility at the interim analysis. Although both Zhu et al. and Shi and Yin
reconciled frequentist methods to Bayesian methods to some extent, the final results were sensitive
to Bayesian prior specifications. To be more specific, the Bayesian type I error rate can vary
because stopping boundaries are computed without taking prior distributions into account.
Furthermore, the other frequentist concept, the type II error rate, may not be preserved as desired
either, under different prior distributions. Overall, there is no available method to unify frequentist
and Bayesian approaches on both type I and II error rates in clinical trials.
To address the above issues and create an exact one-to-one mapping between frequentist
and Bayesian group sequential methods given different Bayesian priors, we propose novel unified
approaches for frequentist and Bayesian hypothesis testing problems in one-sided two-arm fixedsample and group-sequential clinical trials with binary endpoints. When a frequentist design is
given, the unified approach determines the Bayesian sample size and decision thresholds through
12

a theoretical approach. When a Bayesian design is given, the unified approach calculates the
frequentist type I and II error rates, leading to a corresponding frequentist design. For groupsequential trials, alpha spending functions for controlling the overall type I error rate and beta
spending function for controlling the overall type II error rate are utilized. It is assumed that
clinical trials have two arms with binary outcomes. Beta conjugate priors and decision makings
based on posterior probabilities for treatment difference are used in Bayesian methods. Also, we
derive the distributions of Bayesian posterior probabilities and provide closed-form solutions to
compute Bayesian type I and II error rates in this dissertation work. Additionally, a user-friendly
software application implementing the proposed unified approaches has been built to allow ease
of use by clinical trialists.
Using the proposed unified approaches, a detailed numerical investigation is performed to
compare frequentist and Bayesian approaches for different design parameters, such as Bayesian
prior specifications, numbers of analyses, allocation ratios and stopping boundaries. The
comparison is objective because the frequentist methods and Bayesian methods correspond to each
other regarding the type I and II error rates. The influences of these design parameters on the
Bayesian maximum and expected sample sizes are also evaluated. Evaluation results can help
clinical trialists to gain insights into the optimality of frequentist and Bayesian paradigms in
clinical trials.
Overall, the dissertation work has the following highlights:
1. The dissertation establishes a 1-to-1 mapping between frequentist and Bayesian
methods in clinical trials. This mapping achieves the unification of frequentist and
Bayesian without adjusting any tuning parameters. Therefore, the unified
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approaches can lower the entry point to Bayesian methods for some frequentist
clinical trialists, as well as help Bayesian biostatisticians embrace classical methods.
2. The unified approaches inherit the classical frequentist approach for fixed sample
clinical trials and group-sequential clinical trials(Jennison & Turnbull, 2000;
Lachin, 1981), which is conceptually easy to frequentist clinical trialists. From the
perspectives from Bayesian biostatisticians, The proposed theoretical methods can
help to rid of long-time simulations and obtain frequentist characteristics quickly.
3. Further evaluations show that frequentist and Bayesian methods can outperform
each other with respect to sample sizes under the circumstance. Results indicate
that frequentist and Bayesian methods both can play important roles in clinical trials.
Thus, the dissertation can help clinical trialists to select the optimal method
regarding the sample sizes in real practice.
Note, before developing novel unified approaches for frequentist and Bayesian methods in
clinical trials, a careful literature review is conducted to help crystalize our specific aims. The
entire process of the literature review is displayed in Figure 1.1 in appendix section 1.5. The
review starts with understanding frequentist and Bayesian methods and their conflicts. Then the
advantages and disadvantages of the Bayesian approach are reviewed. Finally, existing approaches
to reconciling or unifying frequentist and Bayesian methods are reviewed.
The rest of this chapter summarizes the literature review results and is structured as follows.
Chapter 1.2 and 1.3, briefly introduce frequentist and Bayesian methods, with some advantages
and pitfalls which have been stated in the literature. Most of the frequentist and Bayesian methods
introduced are used to develop the novel unified approaches in the following chapters. In Chapter
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1.4, a detailed review summarizes previous work on exploring correspondences between the
frequentist and Bayesian methods is present.

1.2 Frequentist Methods
1.2.1 Frequentist Philosophy
The frequentist paradigm originates from the concepts of p-value and hypothesis testing. The pvalue was proposed by Ronald Fisher in the 1920s as indices of the strength of the evidence against
the null hypothesis; it represents the probability of obtaining data equal to or more extreme than
the observed one if the null is true. Commonly, statisticians degrade the p-value into dichotomy
based on some decision threshold. Fisher suggested a p-value of 0.05 or less as indicating strong
evidence against the null.
Instead, Neyman and Pearson proposed a hypothesis-testing framework, in which they
defined type I and II error rates, denoted as 𝛼 and 𝛽, and a decision threshold (or called the critical
value by frequentist statisticians), denoted as c. The type I error rate is defined as the probability
to accept an alternative hypothesis when the null hypothesis is true, whereas the type II error rate
is defined as the probability of failing to reject the null when the alternative is true. For the given
type I and II error rates, the decision threshold can be specified. In the hypothesis testing
framework, a test statistic, denoted as 𝑇, is calculated in each hypothesis test. The null hypothesis
is rejected if the test statistic 𝑇 is greater than the pre-specified decision threshold c. If the test
statistic falls into above the decision threshold, the null hypothesis is rejected. Although p value
and Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing are different concepts, current frequentist methods
combine them together in practice. For instance, one can reject the null in a normal test at a
significance level of 0.05, either using the decision threshold of 1.96 or the p value of 0.05.
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1.2.2 Frequentist Hypothesis Testing
Typically, a frequentist hypothesis test involves a null hypothesis, denoted as 𝐻0 , and an
alternative hypothesis, denoted as 𝐻1 . In clinical trials comparing success rates (denoted as 𝜋1 and
𝜋2 ) between two treatments, the 𝐻0 is often stated such that success rates of the experimental and
control groups are not different (i.e. 𝐻0 : 𝜋1 = 𝜋2 ). The alternative hypothesis can be one-sided or
two sided. In one-sided tests, the 𝐻1 is stated such that the success rate of the experimental arm is
greater than that of the control (i.e. 𝐻1 : 𝜋1 > 𝜋2 ) or the mortality rate of the experimental arm is
smaller than that of the control (i.e. 𝐻1 : 𝜋1 < 𝜋2 ). In two-sided tests, the 𝐻1 is stated such that the
success rate of the experimental arm is either greater or smaller than that of the control (i.e.
𝐻1 : 𝜋1 ≠ 𝜋2 ). Sometimes, the null hypothesis can be stated also as the rate difference between the
experimental arm and the control arm is less than a minimal clinical meaningful significance, ∆.
That is, 𝐻0 : 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 ≤ ∆. Correspondingly, the alternative hypothesis can be stated as success
rates between the experimental arm and the control arm is greater than ∆, 𝐻1 : 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆.
When performing a hypothesis test, frequentist philosophy considers probabilities as
frequencies. That is, 𝜋1 and 𝜋2 , are meaningful only when they are considered as the limit of a
specific event's (e.g. success, mortality) relative frequency in repeated trial experiments:
𝑦𝑖
, 𝑖 = 1,2,
n𝑖 →∞ 𝑛𝑖

𝜋𝑖 = lim

where the subscript i is used to denote treatment groups, 𝑦𝑖 and 𝑛𝑖 are the number of events and
number of trials. It can be seen that 𝜋1 and 𝜋2 are fixed numbers and have no associated
probability distributions. Since it is impossible to conduct endless experiments and obtain the value
of 𝜋, the mean of the sample, denoted as 𝜋̂, is often used to approximate 𝜋. 𝜋̂, however, has a
distribution conditional on the value of 𝜋.
16

Furthermore, assume there are multiple sample means, 𝜋̂.1 , 𝜋̂.2 , … , 𝜋̂.𝑚 of m samples
collected from the population, the frequentist central limit theorem states that the sampling
distribution follows a normal distribution regardless of what the original distribution 𝜋 has. The
resulting normal distribution makes it convenient to perform the frequentist hypothesis test and
sample size calculation. For the hypothesis testing problem, the test statistic 𝑇 is constructed based
on the sampling distribution. For instance, assume there is a clinical trial comparing two treatments,
in which patients are equally randomized into two groups. The test statistic is defined as:

𝑇=

𝜋
̂1 − 𝜋
̂2
𝜋
̂(1 − 𝜋
̂)
𝜋
̂(1 − 𝜋
̂)
1
√ 1
+ 2 𝑛 2
𝑛1
2

.

Using the Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing framework, the decision threshold c is defined as
𝑍1−𝛼 , where 𝑍1−𝛼 is the (1 − 𝛼)𝑡ℎ quantile of the standard normal distribution. Alternatively, we
can calculate the p value by subtracting the percentile of T evaluated at the standard normal
distribution from one, and compare the p value to a threshold value, e.g. 0.05. The threshold is also
called the significance level.
1.2.3 Freuqentist Sample Size Determination for Fixed-Sample Methods
Similar to the hypothesis testing problem, the frequentist sample size determination is
based on the sampling distribution. Methods for calculating sample size for fixed-sample clinical
trials comparing two proportions was illustrated in detail by Lachin (1981). The frequentist sample
size calculation approach utilizes the relationship between type I and II error rates and the decision
threshold (see Figure 1.2). Mostly, the sample size is chosen as the smallest value to control some
pre-specified type I and II error rates. Consider the same clinical trial comparing two equal-sized
treatment groups as in section 1.2.2, and let 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 denote the assumed treatment effect for two
groups at the beginning of the trial. The sample size for each treatment group is calculated as:
17

𝑍1−𝛼 + 𝑍1−𝛽 2
𝑛𝑖 = (
) (𝑃1 (1 − 𝑃1 ) + 𝑃2 (1 − 𝑃2 )), 𝑖 = 1,2,
𝑃1 − 𝑃1
where 𝑍1−𝛼 and 𝑍1−𝛽 are the (1 − 𝛼)𝑡ℎ and (1 − 𝛽)𝑡ℎ quantile of the standard normal distribution. If
patients are unequally assigned to two treatment arms with an allocation ratio 𝑟, 𝑟 ≠ 1, so that the
patient size in the experimental arm is r times the size in the control arm. The sample sizes for the
two treatment can be calculated as:
𝑛1 = 𝑟𝑛2
𝑍1−𝛼 + 𝑍1−𝛽 2 𝑃1 (1 − 𝑃1 )
{
.
𝑛2 = (
) (
+ 𝑃2 (1 − 𝑃2 ))
𝑃1 − 𝑃1
𝑟
Overall, the hypothesis testing and sample size determination are conceptually simple and
the central limit theorem allows quick computation for results. Thus, frequentist approaches have
been the predominant methods for modern clinical trial research since the 1940s (J. J. Lee & Chu,
2012). The medical community and regulatory agencies have also adopted frequentist approaches
as the testing standard in clinical trials (Teira, 2011). In addition, the ICH E-9 guidance largely
refers to the use of frequentist methods when discussing hypothesis testing problems (ICH, 2017).
1.2.3 Group-Sequential Methods
For the above frequentist hypothesis tests and sample size determination for clinical trials,
one assumption is that those clinical trials have only a final analysis when all patients recruited.
Such fixed-sample design is unjustified for ethical and financial concerns because patients entered
the study sequentially and the trial should be terminated when accumulated data is sufficient to
conclude (Pocock, 1977). Thus, frequentist group sequential methods are proposed to analyze
clinical trial data (Peter Armitage, 1958; O’Brien & Fleming, 1979; Pocock, 1977). Armitage
(1958) was the first person to introduce sequential method into clinical trials, and Pocock (1977)

18

and O’Brien and Fleming (1979) help polish the frequentist group-sequential methods for clinical
trials. In group sequential clinical trials, the patients’ enrollment is partitioned into multiple stages.
At the end of each stage, a hypothesis test is carried out on accumulating clinical trial data, where
all statistical tests performed prior to the complete patient enrollment are called interim analyses.
Suppose there are 𝐽 stages and let j denote the stage, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽. Let 𝑛.𝑗 denote the accumulated
number of patients at the end of the jth stage. A hypothesis test at the jth stage is formalized as
follow:
𝜋̂
̂
1𝑗 − 𝜋
2𝑗

𝑇𝑗 =
√

.

𝜋̂
̂
𝜋̂
̂𝑗 )
1𝑗 (1 − 𝜋
1𝑗 )
2𝑗 (1 − 𝜋
+
𝑛1𝑗
𝑛2𝑗

Note, 𝑇1 , 𝑇2 , … , 𝑇𝐽 follow a multivariate normal distribution (Jennison & Turnbull, 2000). That is,
𝑇𝑗 ~𝑁 ((𝑃1 − 𝑃2 )√𝐼𝑗 , 1) , where (𝑃1 − 𝑃2 )√𝐼𝑗 is called a drift parameter and 𝐼𝑗 is the Fisher
information available at the jth stage. Further, the covariance between 𝑇𝑗1 and 𝑇𝑗2 , 𝑗1 < 𝑗2 is
√𝐼𝑗1 /𝐼𝑗2 .
In addition, the group-sequential design can have two decision thresholds for each analysis,
one for efficacy, denoted as 𝑐𝐸,. and another for futility, denoted as 𝑐𝐹,. . The set of 𝑐𝐸,𝑗 and 𝑐𝐹,𝑗 ,
𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, are also called efficacy and futility stopping boundaries. The trial is stopped at the jth
stage for overwhelming benefits of the experimental treatment if 𝑇𝑗 > 𝑐𝐸,𝑗 , or it is stopped for
sufficient negative treatment effect if 𝑇𝑗 < 𝑐𝐹,𝑗 . Otherwise, the trial shall continue to the next
analysis. Note, a final conclusion must be made at the final analysis, so that 𝑐𝐸,𝐽 is set to equal 𝑐𝐹,𝐽 .
Such group-sequential methods are ethically and economically beneficial, especially for
confirmatory trials in which patient sample sizes are large.
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Furthermore, these stopping boundaries are computed to achieve the desired type I and II
error rates. Since repeated analyses are conducted in group-sequential clinical trials, it is widely
acknowledged that the allowed type I error rate for each analysis has to be smaller than the desired
type I error rate in order to preserve the overall type I error rate (Armitage, McPherson, & Rowe,
1969; DeMets & Lan, 1994; O’Brien & Fleming, 1979; Pocock, 1977). The overall type I error
rate is usually the sum of the stagewise type I error rates and the same for the overall type II error
rate. For instance, in group sequential trials with only efficacy boundaries, the following
relationship between a set of efficacy boundary values and the overall type I error rate should be
met:
𝑗−1

𝐽

∑ 𝑃𝑟𝐻0 (⋂ 𝑇𝑗 ∗ ≤ 𝑐𝐸,𝑗 ∗ ∩ 𝑇𝑗 > 𝑐𝐸,𝑗 ) = 𝛼,
𝑗∗

𝑗=1

and for group sequential trials with only futility boundaries, the following relationship should be
met:
𝑗−1

𝐽

∑ 𝑃𝑟𝐻1 (⋂ 𝑇𝑗 ∗ ≥ 𝑐𝐹,𝑗∗ ∩ 𝑇𝑗 < 𝑐𝐹,𝑗 ) = 𝛽.
𝑗∗

𝑗=1

For group sequential clinical trials with both efficacy and futility boundaries, the following
equations should be satisfied for stopping boundaries and type I and II error rates:
𝐽

𝑗−1

∑ 𝑃𝑟𝐻0 (⋂ 𝑐𝐹,𝑗 ∗ ≤ 𝑇𝑗 ∗ ≤ 𝑐𝐸,𝑗∗ ∩ 𝑇𝑗 > 𝑐𝐸,𝑗 ) = 𝛼,
𝑗=1

𝑗∗

and
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𝑗−1

𝐽

∑ 𝑃𝑟𝐻1 (⋂ 𝑐𝐹,𝑗 ∗ ≤ 𝑇𝑗 ∗ ≤ 𝑐𝐸,𝑗 ∗ ∩ 𝑇𝑗 ≤ 𝑐𝐹,𝑗 ) = 𝛽.
𝑗∗

𝑗=1

Note that all the above conditions assume binding boundaries where the trial is stopped if futility
boundaries have been crossed during interim analyses. Some clinical trialists prefer using nonbinding boundaries where flexibility is offered to interim analyses (Schüler, Kieser, & Rauch,
2017). The trial can continue despite that futility boundaries are crossed and efficacy boundaries
are derived regardless of stopping for futility. That is:
𝐽

𝑗−1

∑ 𝑃𝑟𝐻0 (⋂ 𝑇𝑗 ∗ ≤ 𝑐𝐸,𝑗 ∗ ∩ 𝑇𝑗 > 𝑐𝐸,𝑗 ) = 𝛼.
𝑗=1

𝑗∗

Notably, there are multiple ways to allocate the type I error rate into different stages, and
thus, resulting in various types of stopping boundaries. Pocock (1977) considered the type I error
rate allowed for each analysis, 𝛼𝑗 , as a constant value smaller than the overall type I error rate 𝛼.
O’Brien-Fleming (1979) considered very stringent decision thresholds at early stages and the
decision threshold decremented with stages. Nowadays, O’Brien-Fleming boundaries are
frequently used in evaluating treatment efficacy, because they require the observed treatment effect
to be very convincing and they preserve a type I error rate close to that of a fixed-sample design
(Chen, Ibrahim, & Chu, 2014).
Other commonly used stopping boundaries include Haybittle-Peto boundaries (Haybittle,
1971; Peto et al., 1976) and boundaries for the triangular test (Whitehead & Stratton, 1983).
Haybittle-Peto boundaries assign the same type I error rate to all interim analysis, but consider the
type I error allowed at final analysis to be 𝛼. The biggest advantage of Haybittle-Peto boundaries
is they allow reporting the final results under the pre-defined significance level 𝛼. Nevertheless,
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the boundaries for interim analyses may be too stringent to terminate a potentially effective
treatment. Whitehead and Stratton (1983) also developed stopping boundaries specifically for
triangle test. However, the triangle test is less used compared to commonly used classical groupsequential test.
1.2.4 Alpha Spending Function
Notably, a limitation for stopping boundaries discussed above is they require all analyses
to be evenly spaced in terms of time or patient enrollment. Therefore, the timing of interim analyses
must be specified in advance (O’Brien & Fleming, 1979). To overcome this issue, Lan and
DeMets (1994; 1983) proposed alpha spending functions to provide flexibility such that clinical
trialists can plan interim analyses at unevenly spaced time points. The alpha spent at each interim
analysis is a function of the information fraction, denoted as 𝜏. The information fraction of the jth
stage, 𝜏𝑗 , is defined as 𝑛𝑗 /𝑛𝐽 , where 𝑛𝐽 is the maximum sample size required in the clinical trial.
Lan and DeMets(1994; 1983) considered four types of alpha spending functions in their papers:
𝛼1 (𝜏) = 2 − 2Φ(𝑍𝛼/2 /√𝜏),

O’Brien-Fleming

𝛼2 (𝜏) = 𝛼𝑙𝑛(1 + (𝑒 − 1)𝜏),

Pocock

𝛼3 (𝜏) = 𝛼𝜏 𝜃 , for 𝜃 > 0,

Power

𝛼4 (𝜏) = 𝛼[(1 − 𝑒 −𝛾𝜏 )/(1 − 𝑒 −𝛾 )], for 𝛾 ≠ 0.
𝛼1 and the increments 𝛼2 − 𝛼1 , … , 𝛼𝑗 − 𝛼𝑗−1 are the type I error rate allowed for the analysis at
stage 1,2, … , 𝐽. Beta spending functions are developed to allocate the type II error rate into at each
analysis in group sequential trials. Similarly, it is shown that beta spending functions control the
overall type II error rate at a desired level (Anderson & Clark, 2010).
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1.2.5 Frequentist Sample Size Determination for Group-sequential Methods
For classical group sequential clinical trials, the sample size calculation methods have been
discussed in the literature (Jennison & Turnbull, 2000; Lehmacher & Wassmer, 1999). Since group
sequential methods allow early termination, a maximum sample size (MSS) and an expected
sample size (ESS) should be calculated. The maximum sample size is the sample size needed if
the trial is not stopping at any interim stages. Since the sample size is proportional to the Fisher
information, the maximum sample size can be obtained if the maximum Fisher information is
derived. The maximum Fisher information is also the inverse of the variance of 𝜋̂
̂
1𝐽 − 𝜋
2𝐽 . For
original Pocock and O’Brien-Fleming stopping boundaries, Jennison & Turnbull (2000) tabularize
a constant ratio of maximum information of a group-sequential clinical trial design to the
information of a fixed-sample clinical trial design. The constant ratio is a function of the type I
error rate, 𝛼, the type II error rate, 𝛽, and the number of stages, J. For group-sequential design with
error spending boundaries, efficacy stopping boundary values are derived recursively for given
alpha spent at each stage, if there is an efficacy stopping rule. Then the maximum information is
obtained so as to a desired type II error rate (statistical power) is satisfied. Overall, the final
maximum sample size can be calculated as:

MSS = 𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑

𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥
,
𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑

where 𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 and 𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 are the sample size and Fisher information for the fixed-sample clinical
trial design, and 𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum Fisher information for the group-sequential design.
While the expected sample size is the sum of accumulated sample sizes at all stages, each
multiplied by the probability of stopping at the corresponding stage. The expected sample size for
a clinical trial with two stopping boundaries can be calculated as follow:
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𝑗−1

𝐽−1

ESS = ∑ 𝑛𝑗 𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑗 < 𝑐𝐹,𝑗 ∪ 𝑇𝑗 > 𝑐𝐸,𝑗 ) + 𝑛𝐽 𝑃𝑟 (⋂ 𝑐𝐹,𝑗 ≤ 𝑇𝑗 ≤ 𝑐𝐸,𝑗 ).
𝑗=1

𝑗

1.3 Bayesian Methods
Although frequentist methods have dominated clinical trials in the past few decades, they
receive some criticisms from clinical trialists. One particular criticism is that the frequentist
inference on 𝜋 is indirect as it calculates the conditional probability of 𝜋̂ given the 𝜋. The indirect
inference leads to misinterpretations of trial results. A common mistake some clinicians make on
interpreting the p-value is they think p-value is the probability of the null hypothesis to be true
(Cohen, 2011). However, the p-value does not refer to the probability related to the null hypothesis,
actually, the p value should be interpreted as the probability to have a treatment effect at least as
extreme as the observed value when the null hypothesis is true.
In contrast to frequentist inferences, the other statistical paradigm, Bayesian methods, can
assign a probability distribution to 𝜋 and calculate the probability of 𝜋 conditional on the observed
data (Bayarri & Berger, 2004; D. A. Berry, 2006; J. J. Lee & Chu, 2012). Therefore, clinical
trialists are able to assign a probability to the hypothesis by using Bayesian methods. There are
some other purported advantages for Bayesian methods, such as incorporating historical
information for the treatment effect (D. A. Berry, 2006), as well as fitting naturally with sequential
updating in group-sequential methods (Bayarri & Berger, 2004). In the following sections, an
overview of Bayesian methods for clinical trials with a specific focus on those for binary outcomes,
is presented.
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1.3.1 Bayesian Philosophy
Although the establishment of the Bayes theorem by Thomas Bayes can date back as early as the
18th century, Bayesian methodologies were not introduced into clinical trials until 1960
(Anscombe & Aumann, 1963; Cornfield, 1966, 1969; Cornfield & Greenhouse, 1967; Novick &
Grizzle, 1965). Anscombe and Aumann (1963) brought up a Bayesian approach to analyze data
from group-sequential clinical trials. Novick and Grizzle (1965) proposed a Bayesian probability
model for clinical trials with categorical outcomes and discussed the usage of Bayesian priors.
Cornfield (1966, 1969, 1976), along with Greenhouse (1967) have made several contributions to
implementing Bayesian methods in clinical trials. He advocated using Bayesian approaches to
monitor clinical trials. Although frequentist methods dominate the field of clinical trials in the 20th
century, Bayesian methods are becoming increasingly popular for clinical trials in recent years.
The development of Bayesian methods is largely due to the advances in computer hardware and
software, which makes it feasible to compute-intensive algorithms in Bayesian methods, e.g.
Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling methods. The formal support from regulatory agencies also
helps popularize Bayesian approaches in clinical trials (FDA, 2014; ICH, 2017). In addition,
various standard Bayesian approaches to clinical trials were developed with the improvement of
computer power (e.g. D. A. Berry, 2006; S. M. Berry et al., 2010; Freedman & Spiegelhalter, 1989;
David J Spiegelhalter, Freedman, & Parmar, 1994).
Philosophically, the Bayesian probability represents the degrees of certainty about a
specific event, e.g. the success rate of a new treatment. In the Bayesian paradigm, there is a prior
belief about the treatment effect 𝜋. The prior belief can be summarized from similar historical
studies or be synthesized from the clinician’s opionion about the treatment effect. A probability
distribution, called prior probability distribution, must be speficied for the prior belief. When data
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is collected during the clinical trial, the prior belief about the treatment effect with the new
observed evidence from the data. The resulting probability distribution, named the posterior
probability distribution, represents the updated knowledge about the treatment effect. The posterior
probability distribution is proportional to the product of the prior probability distribution and the
likelihood of the observed data, which is also known as the Bayes’ theorem, or Bayes’ rule.
Another important Bayesian philosophy is that Bayesian methods follow the likelihood
principle. The likelihood principle states that all evidence of the treatment effect should come from
the data, which ensures the posterior probability distribution of the treatment effect to be
appropriate, as long as the prior distribution is specified properly (Diamond & Kaul, 2004; M. D.
Lee, 2006).
1.3.2 Bayesian Prior Probability Distribution
As mentioned above, applying Bayesian methods in clinical trials starts with selecting a prior
probability distribution. In clinical trials comparing two proportions, the prior distribution of the
treatment effect is often specified as a beta distribution:
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 ), 𝑖 = 1,2,

(1.1)

where a and b are the shape parameters of the beta distribution. Such a beta prior takes the
advantage of conjugation. To be more specific, with binomially distributed data, the resulting
posterior probability also has a beta distribution and is easy to compute. The elicitation of Bayesian
beta priors can be intuitive as well, as 𝑎/(𝑎 + 𝑏) can represent the mean or mode for the treatment
effect (Fox, 1966; Gross, 1971). Morita et al. (2012) proposed the concept of prior sample size.
The authors define 𝑎 + 𝑏 as the prior sample size for the clinical trials.
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Note, there are several other formal ways to parameterize the beta priors in clinical trials.
Thall and Estey (1993) suggested eliciting a beta prior using the prior mean 𝑎/(𝑎 + 𝑏) and the 90
percentile probability interval, denoted as 𝑊90 , rather than specifying a and b. Such prior
specification method is intuitive to clinicians. The authors also recommended to check the tails of
the obtained prior distribution to see if the extreme values truly reflect the clinician’s opinion on
the treatment effect. Ibrahim and Chen (2000) proposed power prior distributions for regression
models, which combine heterogenous historical information from multiple previous studies to
construct prior distributions.
In addition, Berry and Stangl (1996) used the beta prior distribution assuming parameters
are equal, that is 𝑎 = 𝑏. A beta prior distribution with equivalent parameters essentially indicates
there is no or little prior information about the treatment effect. That is, clinical trialists do not
know if the treatment is efficacious or harmful. The 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1, 1) distribution is commonly used as
non-informative prior in clinical trials. This non-informative prior distribution put equal weight to
all values of 𝜋 and maximize the information from data likelihood in the posterior distribution.
Hence, Bayesian clinical trials using 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1, 1) as priors often produce results similar to results
of frequentist methods (Lewis, Lipsky, & Berry, 2007). Other non-informative priors appear in the
literature include a Jeffery’s prior 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(0.5, 0.5) and a 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(0, 0) prior. Lecoutre and the
colleagues (2011) had considered using these two non-informative prior in their researches.
However, some statisticians (Gelman, Simpson, & Betancourt, 2017; Greenland & Poole,
2013) argued that non-informative priors put too much weight on implausibly large values of 𝜋.
In contrast to non-informative prior, informative priors put changing weights on the values of 𝜋,
therefore, delivery different information about the treatment effect. The informative priors in
clinical trials can be categorized into two classes: optimistic priors and pessimistic priors
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(Dersimonian, 1996; Fayers, Ashby, & Parmar, 1997). Optimistic priors (or referred to enthusiastic
priors) are a class of priors that consider a beneficial treatment effect and the prior mean is greater
than or equal the assumed treatment effect. While pessimistic (or referred as skeptical priors) priors
consider a treatment effect is unlikely to be observed, and the prior mean is no greater than the
assumed treatment effect. The main reasoning for skeptical priors is the clinical treatment effects
are mostly small to moderate, so it may be too unrealistic to have a large treatment effect (Yusuf
& Flather, 1995).
Nevertheless, a problem for informative priors is to choose the appropriate prior probability
distribution (Hughes, 1993). There are controversial opinions about the use of Bayesian
informative priors. On the one hand, people believe prior selection is very subjective and can be
easily biased (J. J. Lee & Chu, 2012). Wrongly specified priors can often obscure the results of
treatment effects. On the other hand, Fayers et al. (1997) have justified the usage of prior in
Bayesian methods. The authors suggested that a pessimistic prior can reduce possibilities to
wrongly draw a conclusion that there is overwhelm treatment effect. As such, an optimistic prior
can lower the chances that an effective treatment is early terminated for futility.
1.3.3 Bayesian Posterior Probability Distribution
While the prior distribution indicates the prior belief in the treatment effect, the posterior
probability shows an updated knowledge about the treatment effect when data is observed. By
Bayes’ theorem, the posterior probability distribution can be obtained combining data likelihood
with respect to the hypothesis and the prior probability distribution. Suppose there are 𝑦𝑖𝑗 patients
having successful outcomes among 𝑛𝑖𝑗 patients by the jth stage, the beta prior distribution (1.1)
for the ith treatment group in is updated to the following posterior distribution:
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𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑎𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖𝑗 , 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖𝑗 − 𝑦𝑖𝑗 ), 𝑖 = 1,2

(1.2)

The interpretation of Bayesian posterior probability is intuitive as the posterior distribution
directly associate probability with the treatment effect 𝜋 (J. J. Lee & Chu, 2012). However, the
derivation of posterior probability sometimes may require computation intensive methods such as
Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling methods (Brooks, Gelman, Jones, & Meng, 2011).
1.3.4 Bayesian Hypothesis Testing
Based on (1.2), a Bayesian hypothesis test statistic T can be constructed to test the null
hypothesis 𝐻0 : 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 ≤ ∆ against the alternative hypothesis 𝐻1 : 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆:
𝑇 = 𝑃𝑟(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆),

(1.3)

where 𝑃𝑟(. ) denotes the probability function, 𝜋1 and 𝜋2 each follows the posterior probability
distribution in (1.2). When 𝑇 is greater than some pre-specified decision threshold c, the null
hypothesis is rejected. The test statistic (1.3) is commonly used in Bayesian clinical trials as it can
be nicely interpreted as the probability that the experiment treatment is superior to the control
treatment by a minimal clinically significant difference. For example, Xie et al. (2012), Zaslavsky
(2012) and Gsponer et al. (2014) used (1.3) or its variants in Bayesian hypothesis testing problems.
Kawasaki et al. (2016) proposed a Bayesian equivalent test comparing two proportions
which were based on a similar form of the posterior probability. Slightly different from (1.3), the
authors defined a two-sided test using the posterior probability, that:
𝑇 = 𝑃𝑟(−∆< 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 < ∆),

(1.4)

where T was also called the 𝜅 index by the authors and −∆< 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 < ∆ corresponded to the
equivalence hypothesis test in the frequentist paradigm (Shuirmann, 1987). Thus, both (1.3) and
(1.4) were constructed under Bayesian frameworks, but close to test statistics in a frequentist
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manner. Although the authors applied the index to analyze the data from a real clinical trial, the
authors did not provide a clear guideline on how to make a decision based on the index.
Nonetheless, the calculation of (1.3) and (1.4) may be difficult because the test statistic
does not have a closed-form solution. Monte Carlo sampling techniques are frequently used to
estimate the value of these test statistic (Zaslavsky, 2012). The normal approximation can be used
to estimate (1.3) and (1.4) when ∆= 0 (Kawasaki et al., 2016; Zaslavsky, 2012). Remarkably, we
developed an efficient algorithm to compute a bulk of values of (1.3) with different posterior
distributions of 𝜋1 and 𝜋2 . The details of the algorithm and improvements on the standard MonteCarlo sampling procedure can be found in the original paper (Yu, Ramakrishnan, & Meinzer,
2019).
Note, there are other ways to construct the Bayesian test statistic, T. Berger and Sellke
(1987), Kass and Raftery (1995) and Marden (2000) used Bayes factors to perform the hypothesis
test. The Bayes factor is the ratio of the likelihood probability of the alternative hypothesis to the
null hypothesis. The larger the Bayes factor is, the stronger the evidence favors the alternative
hypothesis. As such, a decision threshold c is required to conclude whether to reject the null
hypothesis. Jeffreys (1961) provided the original decision threshold value tables for Bayes factors,
in which he suggested a Bayes factor greater than 10 to be a strong indicator to reject the null
hypothesis. Kass and Raftery (1995) proposed alternative definitions of the decision thresholds,
for which the authors suggested a Bayes factor larger than 6 as strong evidence towards the
alternative hypothesis.
1.3.5 Bayesian Sample Size Determination
Different from frequentist methods, there is no universal approach to determine the
Bayesian sample size for hypothesis testing problems in clinical trials. Instead, there are multiple
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ways to estimate the sample size for Bayesian clinical trials, depending on the specific Bayesian
hypothesis testing procedure to use. Spiegelhalter (2004) had classified Bayesian sample size
determinations into proper Bayesian methods, decision-theoretic Bayesian methods and Bayesianfrequentist hybrid methods. The proper Bayesian’ approaches, namely, are a collection of methods
to obtain sample size based on pure Bayesian methods. For example, one of the proper Bayesian
methods is to estimate the Bayesian sample size by calculating the minimum number of patients
required for test statistic (1.3) to cross a pre-specified decision threshold c. Moreover, sample size
determination methods with Bayesian methods as fundamentals can all be classified into proper
Bayesian methods (De Santis, 2007; Joseph, du Berger, & Bélisle, 1997; M’Lan, Joseph, &
Wolfson, 2008; Weiss, 1997).
Although decision-theoretic sample size determinations are also built based upon Bayesian
methods, the class of methods is designated in hypothesis testing under the Bayesian decisiontheoretic framework. The decision framework determines optimal sample sizes by maximizing a
utility function or minimizing a risk function. A utility function measures several things that
clinical trialists are interested in, e.g. the safety of the patients, the effect of the experimental
treatment group. A risk function is the expected value of a specific loss function, e.g. mean squared
errors. DasGupta and Vidakovic (1997) proposed a sample size calculation method regarding the
posterior risk function. The authors sought the minimum sample size that kept the Bayes risk above
a threshold value. Katsis and Toman (1999) later extended Gupta and Vidakovic’s method by
adding a constraint which evaluated the likelihood of the Bayes risk function to exceed the
threshold. Sahu and Smith (2006) also proposed an analytic procedure to determine the sample
size using the Bayes risk function. The use of decision-theoretical methods, however, is rarely seen
in real clinical trials (Müller, Berry, Grieve, & Krams, 2006).
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Last, Bayesian-frequentist hybrid approaches combine Bayesian and frequentist methods
together to derive the sample size for Bayesian clinical trials. The main reasoning underlying those
approaches is to introduce uncertainty into traditional frequentist sample size calculations. An
example is the predictive power approach (O’Hagan, Stevens, & Campbell, 2005; Whitehead,
Valdés-Márquez, Johnson, & Graham, 2008). The Bayesian predictive power is defined as the
expectation of the averaged power, give a specific prior distribution. In the predictive power
approach, the power parameter in the classical frequentist sample size calculation formula is
replaced by the Bayesian predictive power. The resulting sample size is considered being derived
from a hybrid of Bayesian and frequentist methods. Alternatively, Wang et al. (2005) introduced
uncertainty to the assumed treatment effect size. The authors replaced the assumed treatment effect
size in frequentist sample size calculation with a Bayesian estimate of the treatment effect. Overall,
hybrid approaches use Bayesian priors on frequentist methods, while many clinical trialists object
to mixing frequentist and Bayesian methods in clinical trials (Inoue et al., 2005).
1.3.6 Bayesian Group-Sequential Methods
Similar to frequentist methods, Bayesian methods can be applied to sequentially analyze
clinical trial data. Considerably, Bayesian’s philosophy to update the knowledge about 𝜋 naturally
fits the group sequential evaluation (Bayarri & Berger, 2004). Cornfield (1966) first suggested
using Bayesian approaches to analyze data from group-sequential trials. A number of Bayesian
group designs have been proposed in the past few decades (e.g. Rosner & Berry, 1995; Saville,
Connor, Ayers, & Alvarez, 2014; Thall, Simon, & Estey, 1995). Like frequentist methods, specific
stopping boundaries need to be determined in Bayesian group-sequential clinical trials.
However, Bayesian stopping boundaries calculations are not as straightforward as those in
frequentist methods. Typically, clinical trialists have to use computer simulations to determine the
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stopping boundaries that meet certain criteria. For example, Thall et al. (Thall, Simon, & Estey,
1995) constructed the stopping boundaries either to maintain equivalence or to achieve some levels
of improvement in the experimental treatment arm compared to the standard of care. Lewis et al.
(2007) used simulations to derive stopping boundaries that yielded type I and II error rates similar
to frequentist methods. In addition, Gsponer (2013) argued to determine stopping boundaries based
on clinicians’ opinions. Zhu et al. (2014) adopted the frequentist alpha spending function
introduced in section 1.2.4 into Bayesian group sequential clinical trials. However, the authors
incorporated only the alpha spending function to determine the Bayesian efficacy stopping
boundaries while assuming the futility boundaries to be decided by clinicians and to be constant
across all stages.
Currently, there are lots of early phase (i.e. phase I/II) clinical trials adopting Bayesian
group-sequential methods (J. J. Lee & Chu, 2012). In comparison, there are less confirmatory
clinical trials implementing Bayesian methods. This is because Bayesian models can be very
complicated in confirmatory trials with large sample sizes, and may lead to substantial type I error
inflation (FDA, 2010). As the Bayesian paradigm does not naturally define the type I error rate,
simulations are utilized to demonstrate control of the type I error rate. There is potential simulation
bias that clinical trialist may choose specific Bayesian parameters for the null hypothesis to mask
the type I error inflation (FDA, 2014; Lai, Lavori, W., & Tsang, 2015). Regulatory agencies are
also more conservative and skeptical about the usage of Bayesian informative priors in
confirmatory trials (FDA, 2014; ICH, 2017). As a result, there has been a long-time debate between
frequentist and Bayesian clinical trialists about whether Bayesian methods should be used in
clinical trials in place of classical methods (Efron, 2005; D J Spiegelhalter et al., 1994).
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1.4 Reconciliations and Unifications
Despite the long-running methodological debate on frequentist versus Bayesian methods in clinical
trials, conflicts between these two methods roots in their philosophies. As discussed in sections
1.2.1 and 1.3.1, frequentist and Bayesian methods have different definitions for probabilities.
Other methodological conflicts in statistical applications between the frequentist and the Bayesian
are discussed in the literature (Lindley, 1957; Little, 2006). The most famous one is the Lindley’s
paradox (1957), where Lindley found that with some specific Bayesian prior distributions,
frequentist and Bayesian hypothesis tests could produce opposite results. It is generally accepted
these two paradigms are difficult to unify on the philosophical level. However, it is possible to
resolve these conflicts on a methodological level (Bayarri & Berger, 2004).
In the following sections, we present a summary of those existing methods. The review
starts with methods contributed to general statistics and then narrows down to methods specifically
developed for clinical trials. Since frequentist methods are more frequently used than Bayesian
methods by the statistical and the clinical trial community for the past few decades, most of the
reviewed approaches were developed to reconcile Bayesian methods on frequentist methods. Other
literature seeks to resolve disagreements between frequentist methods and Bayesian methods.
1.4.1 Reconciliation Frequentist and Bayesian Methods
Several statisticians have sought correspondences between results of frequentist and Bayesian
inferences in statistical data analysis (e.g. J. O. Berger & Sellke, 1987; Casella & Berger, 1987;
DeGroot, 1973; Dickey, 1977; Pratt, 1965; Samaniego & Reneau, 1994; Sellke, Bayarri, & Berger,
2007; Lindley, 1965).
Many of the research work attempted to show Bayesian measures of evidence (i.e.,
posterior probabilities or Bayes factor) consonant with frequentist measures of evidence (i.e., p34

values) in different hypothesis testing problems. For several hypothesis testing problems, it was
shown that frequentist and Bayesian inferences can produce the same results (e.g. Casella & Berger,
1987). That means the Bayesian posterior probability or Bayes factor is equivalent to the
frequentist p-value. But in other hypothesis testing problems, Bayesian results seem to be
irreconcilable to frequentist results (e.g. J. O. Berger & Sellke, 1987; Dickey, 1977). In general,
those reconciliation approaches can be categorized into methods for two-sided hypothesis testing
problems and one-sided hypothesis testing problems, Summaries of each approach are provided
below.
1.4.2 One-Sided Hypothesis Testing Problems
Lindley (1965) showed that the Bayesian posterior probability distributions of test statistics such
as 𝜒 2 or F conditional on a large number of observed data can be approximated by the frequentist
sampling distribution of the test statistic. Thus, the p-value can have a similar interpretation as the
tail area of the posterior probability distribution.
DeGroot (1973) further evaluated whether the frequentist p-value is compatible with the
Bayesian posterior probability of the null hypothesis in tests comparing an arbitrary sample with
one or more than arbitrary reference probability distributions. The author defined a class of
reference distributions and improper Bayesian priors so that the Bayesian posterior probability of
the null hypothesis to be true matched the corresponding frequentist p-value.
While DeGroot considered the reconciliation in the context of a relatively broad class of
null hypotheses, Casella and Berger (1987) narrowed the class down to composite null hypotheses
for the location parameter in one-sided hypothesis tests. Specifically, the authors looked at the null
hypothesis 𝐻0 : 𝜋 ≤ 0 versus the alternative hypothesis 𝐻1 : 𝜋 > 0. Casella and Berger assumed
using Bayesian prior distributions that assigned equal mass to both the null and the alternative
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hypotheses. In the end, the authors found that for certain reasonable priors, the Bayesian posterior
probability that the null hypothesis to be true acquired the same value as the frequentist p-value.
For other priors, the authors found that resulting Bayesian posterior probabilities encompassed the
p-value, suggesting the p-value might be the lower bound or within the range of Bayesian evidence
measures.
Following Casella and Berger, Micheas and Dey (2003) explored the reconciliation
between frequentist p-values and Bayesian prior and posterior predictive p-values using the same
setting (i.e. one-sided test for a point null hypothesis for location parameter). The authors
considered the null hypothesis 𝐻0 : 𝜋 ≤ 𝜋0 versus the alternative hypothesis 𝐻0 : 𝜋 > 𝜋0 . The prior
and posterior predictive p-values are defined as 𝑃𝑟(𝑌 > 𝑦0 |𝜋 = 𝜋0 ) averaged over the prior and
posterior distributions, where 𝑌 is the data from a model and 𝑦0 denotes the observed data (Box,
1980; Rubin, 1983). Micheas and Dey found that the infimum of the prior and posterior predictive
p-values is often the frequentist p-value, with a wide class of prior distributions. Later, Micheas
and Dey (2007) extended their reconciliation to one-sided hypotheses for scale parameters. Similar
results were found when the authors compared frequentist p-values and Bayesian prior and
posterior predictive p-values for a number of priors. For many prior specifications, the infimum of
Bayesian predictive p-values was equal to the classical frequentist p-value.
Alternatively, Yin and the colleagues measured the reconcilability between frequentist and
Bayesian methods in hypothesis tests with the presence of nuisance parameters (Yin, 2011; Yin &
Wang, 2016; Yin & Zhao, 2013). Nuisance parameters are those parameters which are not of
primary interest but still should be included in the statistical model when estimating the main effect.
Inspired by Casella and Berger (1987), Yin and colleagues considered the same problem of testing
one-sided hypotheses. However, the authors checked the reconcilability between the frequentist p36

value and the Bayesian posterior probability with additional assumptions, e.g. tests for a scale
parameter under an exponential distribution (Yin, 2011), test for normal means (Yin & Zhao,
2013) and tests location-scale parameters under a Weibull distribution (Yin & Wang, 2016).
Results from Yin and the colleagues’ work suggested there was still a match between the
frequentist p-value and Bayesian posterior probability under certain circumstances, in
consideration of nuisance parameters.
Altham (1969) considered the reconciliation problem within a slightly different context.
The author investigated the relationship between Fisher’s exact probability and the Bayesian
posterior probability resulted from analyzing a 2 x 2 contingency table. Altham proved that there
was an equivalence between exact probability and the posterior probability by using the identity
between the incomplete beta function and the cumulative binomial distribution. The identity was
mentioned earlier in publications of Hartley and Fitch (1951) and Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961).
Zaslavsky and the colleagues (Zaslavsky, 2010, 2012; Zaslavsky & Scott, 2012) drew a similar
conclusion on the relationship between Fisher’s exact probability and the Bayesian posterior
probability. Differently, Altham calculated the Bayesian posterior probability in terms of the odds
ratio, while Zaslavsky considered the Bayesian posterior probability in terms of the success rate
difference.
1.4.3 Two-Sided Hypothesis Testing Problems
Although reconciliations between frequentist and Bayesian evidence of measure for one-sided
hypothesis testing problems seemed feasible when specific priors were chosen, reconciliations for
two-sided hypotheses were not always successful.
Dickey (1977) considered the reconciliation between the frequentist p-value and the Bayes
factor for the hypothesis testing problem with a point null hypothesis 𝐻0 : 𝜋 = 0 versus a two-sided
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composite alternative hypothesis 𝐻1 : 𝜋 ≠ 0. The author made an assumption that observed sample
data were from a normal distribution. Furthermore, the Bayes factor is defined as the posterior
distribution to the prior distribution, evaluated at 𝐻1 for 𝜋 = 0. At last, Dickey found that the
frequentist p-value was consistently smaller than the infimum of the Bayes factor.
Berger and Selke (1987) also considered reconciling frequentist and Bayesian measures of
evidence in two-sample two-sided hypothesis testing problems with normal endpoints. The same
hypotheses as in Dickey (1977), 𝐻0 : 𝜋 = 0 versus 𝐻1 : 𝜋 ≠ 0 was tested. However, the authors
evaluated the Bayesian posterior probability of the null hypothesis instead of the Bayes factor. The
posterior probability conditional on the observed data 𝑦 is defined as 𝑃(𝐻0 |𝑦). The frequentist pvalue was calculated based on the same data. Berger and Selke found that regardless of which prior
distribution was used, Bayesian approaches always yielded posterior probabilities above the predefined decision threshold, leading to fail to reject the null hypothesis. On the contradictory, the
calculated frequentist p-values were always less than the significance level of 0.05, which meant
the null hypothesis should be rejected. Hence, a conclusion could be made that frequentist p-values
and Bayesian posterior probability of the null hypothesis were irreconcilable when analyzing a
two-sample two-sided hypothesis testing problem assuming normal endpoints.
Nonetheless, De La Horra (Horra, 2005) showed that it was possible to reconcile classical
and prior predictive p-values in the two-sided hypothesis testing problems for location parameter.
Following Micheas and Dey’s reconciliation work for location parameter on one-sided hypothesis
tests (Micheas & Dey, 2003), De La Horra computed the prior predictive p-value by averaged
𝑃𝑟(𝑌 > 𝑦0 𝑜𝑟 𝑌 < −𝑦0 |𝜋 = 𝜋0 ), 𝑦0 > 0 over the prior distribution. The author found that for
some given prior distributions, the frequentist p value is equivalent to the Bayesian prior predictive
p-value.
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In addition, Dempster (1973), Aitkin (1997) and Smith and Ferrari (2014) explored the
correspondence between frequentist p-value and the posterior in likelihood ratio test. Dempster
(1973) proposed the posterior distribution of likelihood ratio (PLR) for hypothesis testing
problems in the simple versus two-sided composite case. The PLR was defined as
𝑃𝑟(𝐿𝑅(𝜋, 𝑦) ≤ 𝜁|𝑦), where 𝐿𝑅(𝜋, 𝑦) was the ratio of the likelihood evaluated at the null to the
maximum likelihood evaluated at the alternative, and 𝜁 was a decision threshold for the likelihood
ratio test. Dempster further accessed whether the PLR might match the frequentist p value of the
likelihood ratio test assuming data was from a normal distribution. Finally, the author found that
when a uniform prior and 𝜁 = 1 were applied, the PLR equaled th p value.
The same comparison between the PLR and the p-value was carried out by Aitkin (1997),
and similar conclusions were reached. However, Aitkin (1997) extended Dempster’s (1973) PLR
definition to more general distributions. But, as long as a smooth prior distribution and 𝜁 = 1
were applied, the PLR asymptotically matched the the p value. Smith and Ferrari (2014) further
made the reconciliation results between the PLR and the p value more generalized, to an invariat
framework. The invariance property allowed establishing an equivalence between frequentist
confidence intervals and Bayesian credible intervals.
1.4.4 Fixed-Sample Clinical Trials
While for general statistic, the literature review suggests that lots of efforts have been made to
reconcile frequentist and Bayesian measure of evidence during statistical inferences. Successful
reconciliations often require specific assumptions related to the hypotheses, endpoints and prior
selection. Compared to two-sided hypothesis testing problems, one-sided hypothesis testing
problems were easier for frequentist p-value and Bayesian posterior probability, or Bayes factor
to achieve reconciliation. For clinical trials, several methods seeking the parallel between
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frequentist and Bayesian methods have also been proposed. However, a large proportion of these
methods are more focused at the design stage rather than the analysis or the inference stage. In
addition, a lot of the reconciliation methods for the frequentist p-value and the Bayesian measure
of evidence are not applicable to clinical trials. This is because post-adjustments on Bayesian prior
distributions may be inappropriate and clinical trials it is more of interest to achieve the same type
I or II error rates between frequentist and Bayesian approaches, as type I and II error rates are
required to be strictly controlled (FDA, 2014). As stated near the end of section 1.1, we aimed to
develop a novel unified approach for frequentist and Bayesian methods for clinical trials with
binary endpoints. The following sections are concerned with existing reconciliations or
unifications between frequentist and Bayesian methods in clinical trials. Details and limitations of
each method are provided below. Since most Bayesian methods for clinical trials use one-sided
hypothesis test and unification methods are developed either assumed there was only one stage or
multiple stages, the related literature is categorized into methods for fixed-sample clinical trials
and group-sequential clinical trials.
Inoue, Berry, Parmigiani (2005) showed that frequentist and Bayesian methods can yield
the same sample size at the design stage in single-arm clinical trials. The authors’ motivation came
from the commonality between frequentist and Bayesian sample size determinations that both
methods sought the minimum sample size to achieve certain goals. Inoue, Berry, and Parmigiani
first clearly defined the frequentist and Bayesian goal functions with respect to the sample sizes,
respectively. Let subscripts F and B denote the frequentist and Bayesian parameter. The frequentist
goal was to reach the power 1 − 𝛽 for an assumed treatment effect, meanwhile controlling the type
I error 𝛼 at the desired level, and the sample size can be defined as:
𝑛𝐹 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑛 ∈ ℕ, 𝐺𝐹 (𝑛, 𝒖) > 𝐺𝐹∗ },
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where ℕ denoted the set of integers, 𝐺𝐹 (𝑛, 𝒖) denoted the frequentist goal function with a unique
frequentist inputs u and the 𝐺𝐹∗ was the desired level of the goal function and was held as a constant.
While for Bayesian sample size calculation, the goal was to reach a targeted rate, named
classification rate, for correctly making the decision whether to reject the null hypothesis
conditional on prior distributions:
𝑛𝐵 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑛 ∈ ℕ, 𝐺𝐵 (𝑛, 𝒗) > 𝐺𝐵∗ },
where 𝒗 are Bayesian inputs for the goal function. Although goal functions were quite different
for frequentist and Bayesian methods, the authors were able to reach a unification between
frequentist and Bayesian sample sizes by setting 𝑛𝐹 = 𝑛𝐵 . Moreover, the authors identified a
unique mapping between the assumed treatment effect in frequentist sample size calculation and
the prior variance in Bayesian sample size calculation. To be more specific, the authors calculated
the frequentist sample size for a given treatment effect and calibrated the variance of the prior
distribution to produce the same sample size.
The unification method developed by Inoue, Berry, Parmigiani (2005) had great
significance because it unified frequentist and Bayesian methods at the design phase of clinical
trials. As clinical trials required to analyze the data as planned, it was inappropriate to reconcile
the frequentist and the Bayesian during data analysis. In addition, the mapping between frequentist
and Bayesian methods on the sample size allowed clinical trialists to conduct clinical trials based
on their own preference.
However, there were several limitations to the unification method. First, it only considered
single-arm clinical trials, while most modern clinical trials are designed to compare two or more
treatments. Second, the Bayesian classification rate was not the same as the frequentist type I error
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rate and is difficult to interpret it to clinicians. It could be difficult for a clinical trial using Bayesian
classification rate while ignoring type I error rate to get approved from regulatory agencies as well.
For instance, in the paper, the authors derived the same sample size between frequentist and
Bayesian approaches when setting the frequentist assumed treatment effect to be 0.1, type I error
rate to be 0.05 and the Bayesian classification rate to 0.9283. The meaning of 0.9283 is relatively
hard to interpret and the classification rate did not guarantee the type I error rate of the Bayesian
approach was also controlled at 0.05. In other words, the frequentist and Bayesian methods were
unified at the design stage for the sample size, but not necessarily in the analysis stage for the same
type I or type II error rates or conclusion.
Zaslavsky (2010, 2012) considered reconciliation between frequentist and Bayesian
measures of evidence methods for several types of fixed-sample clinical trials. The author
restricted the hypothesis tests to one-sided superiority or non-inferiority tests. Further, the author
assumed using conjugate beta distribution with integer parameters as priors and 𝑇 =
𝑃𝑟(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆) as the Bayesian statistic for hypothesis tests. Zaslavsky (2010) compared the
Fisher’s exact p-value with Bayesian posterior probability under single-arm fixed-sample clinical
trials with binary and Poisson outcomes. The author found the p-value can be smaller, equal or
greater than the posterior probability for different choices of prior distributions.
Later, Zaslavsky (2012) showed frequentist and Bayesian hypothesis testing results were
reconcilable in two-arm fixed-sample clinical trials with binary endpoints. Under these conditions,
Zaslavsky proved that a Fisher’s exact p-value can transform into the Bayesian posterior
probability by adjusting the number of events y and total sample size n:
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𝑃𝑟𝐹 (𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆|𝑦1 + 𝑎1 , 𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 − 1, 𝑦2 + 𝑎2 − 1, 𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 − 1)
= 𝑃𝑟𝐵 (𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆|𝑦1 , 𝑛1 , 𝑦2 , 𝑛2 ) + 𝑓(∆),
where 𝑓(∆) is a well-defined function of ∆ by the author. By using this relationship, Zaslavsky
found that p-values of Fisher’s exact test and Bayesian posterior probabilities were close when
non-informative priors were used. Note, the relationship between p-values and posterior
probabilities above was very similar to that established by Altham (1968) and Zaslavsky (2010).
Here, the major difference was Zaslavsky (2013) extended the relationship to a more general null
hypothesis, to include the minimally clinically significant difference, ∆.
Publications of Zaslavsky’s research (Zaslavsky, 2010, 2012) had great importance
because they showed connections between frequentist and Bayesian methods in clinical trials and
proposed methods had potential usage in the comparison between frequentist and Bayesian
methods. Biostatisticians were capable to use frequentist and Bayesian calculations
interchangeably. For example, when the sample size was small, the Bayesian operating
characteristics can be determined by using available software for frequentist methods, while for
large sample size, frequentist characteristics can be computed using Bayesian simulations.
However, it should be noticed that Zaslavsky’s approaches assumed exact test, non-informative
priors with integer parameters, which restricted the use in planning clinical trials. Also, the same
p-values and posterior probabilities did not mean the final type I and II error rates were the same
for frequentist methods and Bayesian methods. Thus, these approaches were less useful in
designing practical clinical trials.
In addition, Zaslavsky and Scott (2012) took a relatively different direction and worked on
the reconciliation between frequentist and Bayesian methods for comparing the mean of multiple
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single samples with a constant value. The authors set the problem for continuous and discrete
outcomes that were commonly seen in clinical trials, e.g. normal or binary endpoints. Data from
both distributions could be evaluated using a normally distributed test. Zaslavsky and Scott
proposed a unified procedure of hypothesis testing problems involving adjustments for multiple
testing, for frequentist and Bayesian methods. The unified procedure calculated order statistics
using adjusted interval limits. The interval limits were defined as the confidence interval for
frequentist methods and the credible interval for Bayesian methods, respectively. The modification
on credible limits was similar to that on the confidence limits because the authors adjusted the
credible limits with respect to an established concept of reconciling the frequentist p-value and the
Bayesian posterior probability (Zaslavsky, 2010).
Results from a numerical study indicated the family-wise type I error rate was controlled
for both frequentist and Bayesian methods by using the unified procedure. However, to use order
statistic for multiple testing is less popular than using other adjustments such as the Bonferroni
correction. The authors also mentioned that computation could be an issue since the convergence
of approximate estimates for the required sample size sometimes could be slow.
1.4.5 Group-Sequential Clinical Trials
Compared to methods for fixed-sample clinical trials which might focus more on the theoretical
aspects, the reconciliations and unification between frequentist and Bayesian methods in groupsequential clinical trials concentrated on the application aspects. Though clinical trialists seldom
use frequentist methods and Bayesian methods together except for that FDA requires to re-assess
a Bayesian confirmatory trial using frequentist test procedures, the possibility to combine
frequentist characteristics and Bayesian methods in the same clinical trial is studied in the literature.
For most of the unification methods in the literature, the authors wanted to control the frequentist
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type I error rate, a concept to be strictly controlled as required by regulatory agencies, while using
Bayesian methods.
Lewis et al. (2007) developed a Bayesian decision-theoretic framework for two-arm groupsequential clinical trials. The core of the decision-theoretic framework was a Bayesian utility
function. The utility function measured several components including the benefits of treatment and
the cost of future patient enrollment. An optimal Bayesian design was attained when the value of
the utility function was maximized.
When Lewis et al. configured the utility function to produce desired frequentist
characteristics, results showed Bayesian methods required a smaller sample size compared to the
frequentist methods. The main reason was that Bayesian clinical trials had more frequent interim
looks than frequentist methods. The authors found that the sample sizes of frequentist and
Bayesian approaches were almost the same when setting the number of analyses for two methods
to be the same and assuming a non-informative prior for Bayesian approaches. In addition to the
sample size, the type I error rates were the same for frequentist and Bayesian methods when the
non-informative prior was applied.
Similarly, Ventz and Trippa (2014) reconciled frequentist methods and Bayesian methods
in multi-arm multi-stage clinical trials within the Bayesian decision-theoretic framework. The
authors defined the utility function to represent the cost of infrastructure in clinical trials and
enrolled patients at each stage, and let the utility function to satisfy the frequentist characteristics
with a constraint. As such, the optimal Bayesian design was obtained by maximizing the expected
value of the utility function. The resulting Bayesian design preserved the optimal Bayesian
characteristics and a Bayesian interpretation, while controlled the frequentist type I error rates.
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Extensive numerical studies verified that the overall type I error rate was controlled as desired, for
different specifications of the utility function.
Although both Lewis et al. (2007) and Ventz and Trippa (2014) developed approaches to
reconcile frequentist methods and Bayesian methods in clinical trials, it is relatively difficult to
implement these approaches in real clinical trials. First, the usage of the decision-theoretical
framework in clinical trials is rare. The decision-theoretical framework was less accepted and
understood by regulatory agencies compared to Bayesian hypothesis testing based on the posterior
probability (FDA, 2014). Second, the determination of the utility function can be very subjective
and to interpret each element in the utility function and explain how each element could affect the
final results can be confusing. Last, finding the optimal design often requires numerous simulations.
The computation becomes intractable when the sample size is large.
Notably, some other Bayesian methods than decision-theoretical approaches were
developed in order to control the frequentist type I error. Zhu (2015) incorporated the frequentist
alpha spending functions into Bayesian group-sequential designs. The authors proposed a
simulation-based algorithm to derive specific efficacy stopping rules in Bayesian group-sequential
designs. The algorithm first simulated a large number of samples from the posterior distribution
of the statistic (1.3), assuming ∆ = 0. The efficacy boundary for the jth analysis is then determined
as the (1 − 𝛼(𝜏𝑗 )) ∗ 100% th percentile of the ordered simulated samples. The final results
indicated that the frequentist type I error rate was well controlled at the desired level. Nonetheless,
Zhu et al. did not consider introducing a corresponding beta spending function for futility
boundaries. Instead, the authors made a claim that the futility boundaries were the same across all
analyses and were determined based upon opinions of clinicians.
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Zhu et al. (2015) utilized a hybrid approach which consists of frequentist concepts and a
Bayesian framework. The design utilized alpha-spending function and the results showed
unification on type I error rate was achieved between frequentist and Bayesian group-sequential
clinical trials in some scenarios. While for other scenarios, Bayesian type I error rates were smaller
than the frequentist values. There were several noticeable limitations. First, the approach requires
obtaining the posterior probability distribution using simulations, which could be time-consuming
and generate simulation bias. The simulation bias could affect the efficacy boundaries. Second,
the correlation between Bayesian posterior probabilities across stages was not considered in the
simulation-based approach, which might lead to wrong alpha spent at each stage for the Bayesian
methods. Third, prior distributions were not considered when computing the Bayesian efficacy
boundaries. Finally, the way to specify futility boundaries and control them as fixed values are not
common cases in clinical trials. Type II error rate was not well controlled and might inflate in the
Bayesian methods.
Shi and Yin(Shi & Yin, 2019) proposed another method to control type I error rate in
single boundary Bayesian group sequential trials. The method reduced the computation burden
required by simulations and maintained the desired type I error rate. However, the authors did not
consider stopping the trial for futility at the interim analysis. Although both Zhu et al. and Shi and
Yin reconciled frequentist methods to Bayesian methods to some extent, the final results were
sensitive to Bayesian prior specifications. To be more specific, the Bayesian type I error rate can
vary because stopping boundaries are computed without taking prior distributions into account.
Furthermore, the other frequentist concept, the type II error rate, may not be preserved as desired
either, under different prior distributions.
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1.5 Appendix

Figure 1.1 The workflow of the literature review. The review starts with understanding frequentist
and Bayesian methods and their fundamental conflicts. Then the advantages and disadvantages of
the Bayesian approach are reviewed to help crystalize our specific aims. Finally, existing methods
on unifying frequentist and Bayesian methods are reviewed.
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Figure 1.2 Relationships among 𝛼, 𝛽 and c, distributions of the test statistic T under the null (the
red curve) and under the alternative (the blue curve) in frequentist hypothesis testing. The c is
determined as the threshold that the area to the right tail of the null distribution is 𝛼 and the area
to the left tail of the alternative distribution is 𝛽.
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CHAPTER TWO: SPECIFIC AIMS
A major limitation spotted from the literature review, is that there is no theoretical method in
clinical trials to achieve the same type I and II error rates between frequentist and Bayesian
methods. Moreover, it should be noticed that many methods in the literature review require
modifications on Bayesian priors to achieve the reconciliation or unification between two
approaches. Nevertheless, it becomes inappropriate to make post adjustments on Bayesian priors
when conducting clinical trial data analysis. In fact, any modification on the prior distribution can
be inappropriate for clinical trials, because prior distribution is often specified to reflect the prior
belief in treatment effect. Thus, novel unified approaches are needed to establish a correspondence
between frequentist and Bayesian methods on type I and II error rates, without changing a specific
Bayesian prior distribution. Since the Bayesian prior distribution is designated to be held fixed, it
is possible to adjust the sample size and decision threshold for Bayesian methods to achieve the
unification.
In addition, some other limitations occurred in the literature for reconciliations or
unifications between frequentist methods and Bayesian methods are summarized. Some previous
work used very complicated analytic forms or simulations, which should cost a lot of time to
implement (Shi & Yin, 2019; Zaslavsky, 2012; Zhu & Yu, 2015); some methods were conceptually
complicated or were difficult to apply in clinical trials (Inoue et al., 2005; Lewis et al., 2007; Ventz
& Trippa, 2014); some results were not generalized enough, e.g. some methods was only
applicable to single boundaries (Shi & Yin, 2019; Zhu & Yu, 2015). We also aim to address these
limitations in our proposed approaches. Thereby, the following three specific aims are proposed.
Reasonings underlying three aims are illustrated in Figure 2.1.
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2.1 Aim 1. A unified approach for frequentist and Bayesian methods in twoarm fixed sample clinical trials with binary endpoints.
First, the distribution of the Bayesian posterior probability will be derived. Second, a one-to-one
mapping between frequentist and Bayesian methods will be established by utilizing the
straightforward classical frequentist hypothesis testing framework. The one-to-one mapping will
provide unified type I and II error rates between frequentist and Bayesian methods. Third, a
theoretical approach to determine the sample size and decision threshold for the Bayesian approach
will be developed. Finally, a comparison is made between two approaches on type I and II error
rate, the sample size will be made under different scenarios through a numerical study.

2.2 Aim 2. A unified approach for frequentist and Bayesian methods in group
sequential clinical trials with binary endpoints.
Aim 2 is concerned with harmonizing and frequentist methods in group sequential clinical trials.
The distribution of posterior probability in Aim 1 will be extended to a multivariate case. Based
on the multivariate distribution, theoretical approaches to calculate corresponding sample size and
stopping boundaries will be provided. Detailed algorithms will be illustrated. Similarly, a
comparison will be carried out between frequentist methods and Bayesian methods on type I and
II error rates, the maximum sample size, the expected sample sizes and stopping boundaries.
In traditional group sequential designs, alpha spending function and beta spending function
are introduced at each analysis to achieve the desired overall type I error rate. Aim 2 is also
concerned with applying alpha spending function and beta spending function in Bayesian methods,
and achieve the same type I and II error rate for each analysis, as corresponding frequentist
methods.
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2.3 Aim 3. Implementation of the unification framework.
Aim 3 is concerned with practical issues to implement proposed unification approaches in Aim 1
and Aim 2. First, a complete investigation will be conducted to evaluate the influence of Bayesian
prior specifications, allocation ratios, and numbers of analyses, on the final sample sizes. The
results will then be compared to frequentist results, and a suggestion for choosing between
frequentist methods and Bayesian methods will be given. Second, a user-friendly software
application to implement the proposed unified approaches will be deployed online, so that other
clinical trialists can use our approaches without writing any code.
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2.4 Appendix

Figure 2.1 Linear progression of logic for three specific aims. The Aim 1 proposes a unified
approach for frequentist and Bayesian methods applied to the simplest case in a clinical trial, which
is the fixed-sample clinical trials. Then the Aim 2 improves the specific Aim 1 and extends the
methodologies to group sequential clinical trials, which is more commonly seen nowadays. Finally,
Aim 3 considers the practical implementation and usage of two unified approaches proposed in
Aim 1 and Aim 2.
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CHAPTER THREE: SPECIFIC AIM 1
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a novel unified approach is proposed for frequentist and Bayesian methods
in one-sided two-arm fixed-sample clinical trials with binary endpoints. It is assumed conjugate
beta priors are used for Bayesian methods. The novelty in the proposed approach is, it unifies
frequentist and Bayesian methods by generating not only the same type I error rate, but also the
same type II error rate in the analysis. In Section 3.2 how the unification is achieved between the
frequentist and Bayesian approaches is discussed. A theoretical argument for all the claims made
is also provided. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 present a one-to-one correspondence between frequentist
and Bayesian designs in clinical trials with binary endpoints.

3.2 Methods
To compare the experimental arm and the control arm in a clinical trial, considering a similar
setting as introduced in Chapter 1. The test of the following one-sided hypothesis is of interest:
𝐻0 : 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 ≤ ∆ versus 𝐻1 : 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆ where 𝜋1 and 𝜋2 are success rates of the experimental
arm and the control arm respectively, and ∆ is the minimal clinically important difference. Here,
∆ is defined as the minimum change in outcomes to prove the experimental arm is clinically
superior to the control arm. In order to conduct hypothesis tests, consider two elements introduced
in Chapter 1 Section 1.2.2, the statistic 𝑇 and the pre-specified decision threshold c. The evidence
of 𝐻0 is rejected in favor of 𝐻1 when 𝑇 > 𝑐. The details of frequentist and Bayesian hypothesis
tests have been illustrated in Section 1.2 and 1.3, only a few notations should be emphasized here.
A conjugated beta prior distribution for treatment i is specified, 𝜋𝑖 ~𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 ), 𝑖 = 1,2, where
𝑎𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖 are shape parameters of the distribution. The uncertainty about 𝜋𝑖 is updated when 𝑦𝑖
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successful events are observed for treatment i in the clinical trial. A posterior probability
distribution is used to represent the updated uncertainty, 𝜋𝑖 ~𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑎𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 ).
Further, let subscript F and B to denote parameters specifically for frequentist methods and
Bayesian methods. The Bayesian statistic 𝑇𝐵 is constructed as the posterior probability that 𝜋1 is
superior to 𝜋2 by at least ∆. That is, 𝑇𝐵 = Pr(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆), which is the same as (1.3). Here, the
form of the posterior probability is chosen because it is intuitive to interpret. For example, the
result of Pr(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > 0.05) = 0.95 can be interpreted as “the probability of the experimental
arm is better than the control arm by at least 0.05 is 95%”. The corresponding type I and II error
rates for the Bayesian approach are defined as follows and can be simulated using Monte Carlo
sampling techniques:
𝛼𝐵 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑟(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆) > 𝑐𝐵 |𝐻0 ),
𝛽𝐵 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑟(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆) ≤ 𝑐𝐵 |𝐻1 ).
Bayesian methods do not necessarily lead to the same error probabilities as frequentist
methods(FDA, 2014). Nevertheless, correspondences still can be established between frequentist
and Bayesian methods on error probabilities. By definition, there is a tradeoff between the type I
error rate, 𝛼 and the type II error rate, β when the total sample size 𝑛 is held fixed. For instance, if
the value of 𝑐𝐵 increases, 𝛼𝐵 should decrease while 𝛽𝐵 should increase, where 𝛼𝐵 and 𝛽𝐵 denote
the Bayesian type I and II error rates. Therefore, we propose a unified approach for frequentist and
Bayesian hypothesis testing to produce the same error rates based on adjustments of Bayesian
threshold 𝑐𝐵 and Bayesian sample size 𝑛𝐵 given that 𝛼𝐵 = 𝛼𝐹 and 𝛽𝐵 = 𝛽𝐹 . Note, while previous
methods have shown that it is possible to adjust priors and ∆ for the Bayesian tests to achieve the
unification, we are reluctant to do so because priors and ∆ are often dictated as pre-specified
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quantities of clinical interest in clinical trials, and thus, modification of these parameters can
influence basic clinical assumptions.
Consider the relationships among 𝛼𝐹 , 𝛽𝐹 and 𝑐𝐹 discussed by Lachin (Lachin, 1981) in
frequentist methods in Figure 1.1, similar relationships among 𝛼𝐵 , 𝛽𝐵 and 𝑐𝐵 also can be
identified if the null and alternative distributions of Pr(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆) are known. However, the
distribution of Pr(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆) is highly skewed and does not have a closed-form solution. Thus,
for the purposes of deriving a closed form solution that does not rely on simulation, a standard
normal quantile transformation on Pr(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆) is applied and the resulting distribution can
be well approximated by the normal distribution when 𝑛𝐵 is sufficiently large.
Although, the method discussed here would hold for any continuous distribution, for
convenience a normal approximation is considered. However, in most clinical trial scenarios,
especially for those Phase III confirmatory trials, where prior information is realistically available
and controlling frequentist characteristics is required by regulatory agencies assumption of
normality has been found adequate.

Let η denote the transformed variable, that is, 𝜂 =

Φ−1 (Pr(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆)), where Φ−1 (∙) is the quantile function of the standard normal distribution.
Still, let 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 denote the assumed treatment effects for the experimental arm and control arm,
and 𝜋
̂1 and 𝜋
̂2 denote the treatment effect estimates for the experimental arm and the control arm,
where 𝜋
̂1 = 𝑦1 /𝑛1 and 𝜋
̂2 = 𝑦2 /𝑛2 . Let 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑎1 , 𝑏1 ) denote the prior for the experimental arm
and 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑎2 , 𝑏2 ) denote the prior for the control arm. The distribution of 𝜂 under 𝐻0 can be
approximated using the following normal distribution:
𝑛1 𝑃2 (1 − 𝑃2 )
𝑛 𝑃 (1 − 𝑃2 )
+ 2 2
(𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 )2 (𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 )2
𝜂|𝐻0 ~𝑁
,
,
𝜇1 (1 − 𝜇1 )
𝜇2 (1 − 𝜇2 )
𝜇1 (1 − 𝜇1 )
𝜇2 (1 − 𝜇2 )
+
√
+
( 𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 + 1 𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 + 1 𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 + 1 𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 + 1)
𝜇1 − 𝜇2 − ∆
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(3.1)

where 𝜇1 and 𝜇2 are the hypothesized posterior mean for the experimental arm and the control arm
respectively, and 𝜇1 = (𝑛1 𝑃2 + 𝑎1 )⁄(𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 ) and 𝜇2 = (𝑛2 𝑃2 + 𝑎2 )⁄(𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 ).
Similarly, the distribution of 𝜂 under 𝐻1 can be approximated using the following normal
distribution, where 𝜇.∗ denotes the hypothesized posterior mean under the alternative.

𝑛1 𝑃1 (1 − 𝑃1 )
𝑛 𝑃 (1 − 𝑃2 )
+ 2 2
(𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 )2 (𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 )2
𝜂|𝐻1 ~𝑁
,
,
𝜇1∗ (1 − 𝜇1∗ )
𝜇2∗ (1 − 𝜇2∗ )
∗
∗
∗ (1
∗)
+
(1
)
𝜇2 − 𝜇2
𝜇1 − 𝜇1
𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 + 1 𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 + 1
√
+
𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 + 1 𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 + 1
(
)
𝜇1∗ − 𝜇2∗ − ∆

(3.2)

where 𝜇1∗ = (𝑛1 𝑃1 + 𝑎1 )⁄(𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 ) and 𝜇2∗ = (𝑛2 𝑃2 + 𝑎2 )⁄(𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 ) . The Proof of
the distribution of 𝜂 is shown blow:
Proof 3.1
Kawasaki et al. (Kawasaki et al., 2016) have shown that 𝑃𝑟(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆) can be
approximated by the CDF of a standard normal distribution. That is,

𝑃𝑟(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆) ≈ Φ

𝜇𝑌1 − 𝜇𝑌2 − ∆
𝜇 (1 − 𝜇𝑌1 )
𝜇𝑌2 (1 − 𝜇𝑌2 )
√ 𝑌1
+
𝑛
+
𝑎
+
𝑏
+
1
𝑛
( 1
1
1
2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 + 1)

,

where 𝜇1 and 𝜇2 are posterior means of 𝜋1 and 𝜋2 , and 𝜇𝑦1 = (𝑦1 + 𝑎1 )⁄(𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 )
and𝜇𝑦2 = (𝑦2 + 𝑎2 )⁄(𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 ). Here, 𝑦1 and 𝑦2 are two independent random variables and
follow binomial distributions that 𝑦𝑖 ~𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝑛𝑖 , 𝑃𝑖 ), 𝑖 = 1,2. When n is large, we have that
𝑦1
𝑛 𝑃
[𝑦 ] ~𝑁 ([ 1 1 ] ,
𝑛2 𝑃2
2

[

𝑛1 𝑃1 (1 − 𝑃1 )
0

0
]).
𝑛2 𝑃2 (1 − 𝑃2 )

Therefore, applying the delta method, the asymptotic distribution of 𝜂 = Φ−1 (Pr(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆))
is a normal distribution, that
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𝑛1 𝑃1 (1 − 𝑃1 )
𝑛 𝑃 (1 − 𝑃2 )
+ 2 2
2
(𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 )
(𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 )2
𝜂~𝑁
,
,
𝜇1 (1 − 𝜇1 )
𝜇2 (1 − 𝜇2 )
𝜇1 (1 − 𝜇1 )
𝜇2 (1 − 𝜇2 )
+
√
+
( 𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 + 1 𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 + 1 𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 + 1 𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 + 1)
𝜇1 − 𝜇2 − ∆

where 𝜇1 = (𝑛1 𝑃1 + 𝑎1 )⁄(𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 ) and 𝜇2 = (𝑛2 𝑃2 + 𝑎2 )⁄(𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 ).

Evaluated

under the null and alternative hypotheses, distributions (3.1) and (3.2) are obtained.
Notably, these two distributions are very similar to distributions of the frequentist test
statistic, 𝑇𝐹 , under 𝐻0 and 𝐻1 . Thus, relationships among Bayesian statistic 𝑇𝐵 , decision threshold
𝑐𝐵 and type I and II error rates 𝛼𝐵 and 𝛽𝐵 can be established. Now, error probabilities, 𝛼𝐵 and 𝛽𝐵
can be represented in terms of the null and the alternative distributions of 𝜂 and 𝑐𝐵 .
𝛼𝐵 = 1 − 𝐹𝜂,𝐻0 (Φ−1 (𝑐𝐵 )),
(3.3)
𝛽𝐵 =

𝐹𝜂,𝐻1 (Φ−1 (𝑐𝐵 )),

where 𝐹𝜂 (∙) denotes the standard normal CDF function. Note that, unlike traditional hypothesis
distribution, the distribution of 𝜂 under the null and alternative represent different normal
distributions, but applying transformations (𝜂 − 𝜇𝜂 )⁄𝜎𝜂 results in an identical standard normal
variable. Thus, the following equation can be derived from (3.3):
Φ−1 (1 − 𝛼𝐵 )𝜎𝜂,𝐻0 + 𝜇𝜂,𝐻0 = Φ−1 (𝛽𝐵 )𝜎𝜂,𝐻1 + 𝜇𝜂,𝐻1 .

(3.4)

By setting 𝛼𝐵 = 𝛼𝐹 and 𝛽𝐵 = 𝛽𝐹 and replace 𝑛1 with 𝑟 ∗ 𝑛2 in equation (3.4), it is possible to
solve the sample size for the control arm. The calculation of (3.4) can be solved using an iterative
root-finding process. The threshold value 𝑐𝐵 can be then calculated using either of the equations
in (3.3) once the sample size is defined. That is:
−1 (1
−1 (𝛽)).
𝑐𝐵 = Φ (𝐹𝜂,𝐻
− 𝛼)) = Φ (𝐹𝜂,𝐻
0
1

(3.5)

The resulting sample sizes 𝑛1 and 𝑛2 allow us to generate the desired type I and II error rates.
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Sometimes the planned optimal sample size is unachievable because of logistic constraints
or too few available patients in clinical trials. In this situation, the maximum sample size and the
type I error rate are often pre-defined, and we determine the power of the study through power
analysis. In Bayesian methods, the Bayesian power of the trial can be calculated as follow:
Φ−1 (1 − 𝛼𝐵 )𝜎𝜂,𝐻0 + 𝜇𝜂,𝐻0 − 𝜇𝜂,𝐻1
𝜑(𝑛𝐵 ) = 1 − Φ (
).
𝜎𝜂,𝐻1

(3.6)

3.2 Results
Table 3.1 provides an example in which the Bayesian sample size and threshold provides
values which are equivalent to desired frequentist type I and II error rates. Assuming that 𝑃1 =
0.65, 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, , with 𝛼 = 0.025 or 0.05 and 𝛽 = 0.1, 0.15 or 0.2 in this example.
Note that under the null hypothesis 𝑃1 = 𝑃2 = 0.5. Table 3.1 show that generated Bayesian type
I and II error rates are consistently matched with the desired values for different values of 𝛼, 𝛽 and
Bayesian prior distributions. The actual values may slightly deviate from the desired values due to
rounding up in the root solution to the equation (3.4) when calculating the sample size. When
different priors are used, the null distribution (3.1) and the alternative distribution (3.2) may shift
as to satisfy the error probabilities. Accordingly, the threshold 𝑐𝐵 changes. All values of 𝑐𝐵 are
large numbers and are close to 1 in Table 3.1, which is similar to what Zaslavsky (2012) suggested
using in a Bayesian hypothesis test.
Also, if 𝑛𝐵 and 𝑐𝐵 are already known, we can obtain 𝛼𝐵 and 𝛽𝐵 through the relationships
defined in equation (3.3). That means if a Bayesian design is presented, a parallel frequentist design
can be found to produce the same error rates. To derive the frequentist design is relatively simple
when comparing to the Bayesian design. Once 𝛼𝐹 and 𝛽𝐹 are known, the sample size calculation
formula is straightforward and has been demonstrated by Lachin(Lachin, 1981). Frequentist
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threshold, 𝑐𝐹 , is defined as 𝑍1−𝛼𝐹 . Table 3.2 illustrate an example of finding equivalent
frequentist designs for a given Bayesian design. Still, it is assumed that 𝑃1 = 0.65, 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 =
1, ∆= 0. Furthermore, we evaluate the parallel between frequentist and Bayesian methods for
Bayesian total sample size of 250 or 500 and 𝑐𝐵 = 0.95. Finally, corresponding 𝑛𝐹 and 𝑐𝐹 for the
frequentist design are obtained. The resulting type I and II error rates are still the same between
frequentist and Bayesian methods. Notably, frequentist sample sizes are different from Bayesian
sample sizes when an informative prior distribution is used.
Figure 3.1 and 3.2 show comparisons of power between frequentist and Bayesian methods and
Bayesian type I error rates, with the total sample size ranges from 150 to 300. Assuming that 𝑃1 =
0.65, 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0 and 𝛼 = 0.05. Further, we evaluate Bayesian powers under three
prior distribution combinations: 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1) for both experimental and control arms, 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(14, 6)
for the experimental arm and 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(10, 10) for the control arm, and 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(6, 14) for the
experimental arm and 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(10, 10) for the control arm. The last two indicate an enthusiastic and
a pessimistic opinion about the treatment effect, respectively. The corresponding Bayesian
threshold 𝑐𝐵 is determined using (2.5), given the sample size.
As shown in Figure 3.1, the Bayesian power is close to the frequentist power when
applying non-informative priors to both treatment arms. However, the Bayesian power is not
equivalent to the frequentist power when using informative prior distributions. The Bayesian
power is higher with an enthusiastic prior than that of a pessimistic prior. Nevertheless, the type I
error rate remains almost the same between the frequentist and the Bayesian methods as shown in
Figure 3.2. Hence, our approach unifies only the type I error rate when frequentist and Bayesian
sample sizes are set to the same value. In addition, this power calculation formula is useful in a
̂2 which deviate from
sensitivity analysis. When observing treatment effect estimates 𝑃̂1 and 𝑃
60

assumed treatment effects 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 , we can calculate the power by replacing 𝑃1 = 𝑃̂1 and 𝑃2 =
̂2 in distributions of 𝜂 under 𝐻0 and 𝐻1 .
𝑃
Frequentist results and Bayesian results of our unified approach are compared through a numerical
study. In the numerical study, several scenarios are investigated including a small treatment effect
𝑃1 = 0.65 and 𝑃2 = 0.5 versus large treatment effect 𝑃1 = 0.7 and 𝑃2 = 0.4 and equal
allocation 𝑟 = 1 versus unequal allocation 𝑟 = 2 using different priors. Assuming that ∆ = 0, 𝛼 =
0.05 and 𝛽 = 0.15, we consider non-informative, optimistic and pessimistic priors for the
experimental treatment arm in the numerical study. The optimistic prior assumes the experimental
treatment is effective. For the small treatment effect scenario, the optimistic prior for the
experimental arm is set as 𝑎1 /(𝑎1 + 𝑏1 ) = 0.65 while for the large treatment effect it is set as
𝑎1 /(𝑎1 + 𝑏1 ) = 0.8. While the pessimistic prior treats a treatment effect is unlikely to be seen, and
is set as 𝑎1 /(𝑎1 + 𝑏1 ) = 0.35 for the small treatment effect and 𝑎1 /(𝑎1 + 𝑏1 ) = 0.2 for the large
treatment effect. The prior for the control arm is always centered at 0.5, that 𝑎2 /(𝑎2 + 𝑏2 ) = 0.5.
In addition, the strength of the prior is taken into account. The strength is represented as the ratio
of the sum of prior parameters to the final sample size. A stronger prior has more influence on the
posterior than a weaker prior. For the small treatment effect scenario, a strong prior is set as 𝑎𝑖 +
𝑏𝑖 = 20 and a weak prior is set as 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 = 10. While for the large treatment effect scenario, a
strong prior is set as 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 = 40, 𝑖 = 1,2 and a weak prior is set as 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 = 10. The results are
shown in Table 3.3. The type I error rate and the power are generated from 10000 simulations
using R for corresponding frequentist and Bayesian methods.
The resulting type I and II error rates are comparable between the frequentist and the
Bayesian methods. In all scenarios, type I and II error rates are approximately the same for
frequentist and Bayesian methods. Frequentist and the Bayesian sample sizes are approximately
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equal when using non-informative priors for Bayesian methods. However, Bayesian sample sizes
are different from frequentist sample sizes when informative priors are applied. When applying
optimistic prior distributions, Bayesian methods require smaller sample sizes than frequentist
methods regardless of whether an unequal allocation ratio is used. For pessimistic priors, Bayesian
methods require larger sample sizes than frequentist methods in equal allocation scenarios. In
contrast, Bayesian sample sizes are smaller than frequentist sample sizes in unequal allocation
cases.

3.3 Conclusions
In this paper, a novel unified approach for frequentist and Bayesian one-sided hypothesis
tests in two-arm fixed-sample trials with binary endpoints was developed. It is assumed that the
Bayesian prior follows a conjugated beta distribution. The approach unified the approaches
controlling for both type I and II error rates resulting from frequentist and Bayesian approaches by
theoretically establishing a one-to-one mapping between these two methods. Unlike previous
approaches that only controlled type I error rate in Bayesian clinical trials, the proposed unified
approach preserves both type I and type II error rates at desired levels by incorporating Bayesian
prior distributions into sample size and threshold determinations. Therefore, for Bayesian
hypothesis testing, it is unnecessary to adjust the prior distribution to achieve the unification with
frequentist methods. In addition, the assumptions are relaxed on priors and hypotheses to make the
approach more generalizable for trials with binary endpoints. Conjugate beta prior parameters need
not necessarily be integers and hypotheses include a parameter to represent the minimal clinically
important difference. Also, theoretical methods for determining the sample size, threshold and
power are provided. These methods do not require intensive computations or simulations. Under
normal approximation to the posterior probability distribution, sample size and threshold values
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were explicitly obtained. As mentioned in Section 3.2, our approach could be extended to any
distribution. The normal approximation was chosen because in most clinical trials this seems
reasonable. (To examine the validity of normal approximation, especially under small samples, a
small simulation study was performed (See Figure 3.3). The approximation seems reasonable.)
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3.4 Appendix

Figure 3.1 Frequentist and Bayesian power comparisons with total sample sizes range from 150
to 300. We assume that 𝑃1 = 0.65, 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0 and α = 0.05. For Bayesian methods,
we evaluate their powers under three prior distribution combinations: 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1, 1) for both arms
(the green curve), 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(14, 6) for the experimental arm and 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(10, 10) for the control arm
(the red curve), and 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(6, 14) for the experimental arm and 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(10, 10) for the control arm
(the blue curve). The black dotted curve refers to frequentist powers.
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Figure 3.2 Bayesian type I error rates under the same assumptions as Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.3 Evaluation of normal approximation under different sample sizes and treatment effect
sizes. Assuming that 𝑃2 = 0.3, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0 and non-informative prior distributions for both
treatment arms. The total sample size varies from 20 to 110 and 𝑃1 varies from 0.35 to 0.65. The
blue line represents the density curve of transformed posterior probabilities under the alternative
hypothesis, 𝜂𝐻1 , and the red line represents the normal distribution used as the approximation to
the distribution of 𝜂𝐻1 . From the figure below, it can be seen that the distribution of 𝜂 can be well
approximated when the sample size is greater than 20.
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Table 3.1 Some scenarios to evaluate the Bayesian type I and II error probabilities 𝛼𝐵 and 𝛽𝐵
under different priors. Assuming that 𝑃1 = 0.65, 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0 with 𝛼 = 0.025 or
0.05, 𝛽 = 0.1,0.15 or 0.2, we report power here but the type II error rate can be calculated as 1 –
power.
Treatment
arm 1
prior

Treatment
arm 2
prior

𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(7,3)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(3,7)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(3,7)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(7,3)

𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(6,4)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(6,4)

Bayesian Bayesian
sample decision
size
threshold
(𝑐𝐵 )
264
0.949
306
0.956
368
0.919
338
0.955
382
0.974
446
0.978
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Desired
type I
error
rate
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.025
0.025
0.025

Generated
type I
error rate

Desired
power

Generated
power

0.0477
0.0482
0.0502
0.0245
0.0233
0.0253

0.8
0.85
0.9
0.8
0.85
0.9

0.801
0.843
0.911
0.813
0.844
0.908

Table 3.2 Some scenarios to evaluate the frequentist sample size under different priors, Bayesian
sample size and threshold. Assuming that 𝑃1 = 0.65, 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, we set a total sample
size for the Bayesian method to be 250 and 500, with 𝑐𝐵 = 0.95. The frequentist type I error rate
and power are simulated using the calculated frequentist sample size.
Treatment
arm 1
prior
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(7,3)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(3,7)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(7,3)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(3,7)

Treatment Bayesian Frequentist Bayesian Frequentist Bayesian Frequentist
arm 2
sample
sample
type I
type I error power
power
prior
size
size
error
rate
rate
250
250
0.0493
0.0501
0.782
0.784
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1)
250
252
0.0574
0.0562
0.804
0.813
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(6,4)
250
246
0.0253
0.0253
0.674
0.681
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5)
500
500
0.0496
0.0498
0.963
0.967
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1)
500
502
0.0565
0.0564
0.968
0.969
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(6,4)
500
496
0.0320
0.0325
0.943
0.946
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5)
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Table 3.3a Results of the numerical study comparing frequentist and Bayesian methods for the
large treatment effect (𝑃1 = 0.65 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃2 = 0.5). Assuming that ∆= 0 with 𝛼 = 0.05 and 𝛽 =
0.15, we report the sample size of the control group (treatment group 2). Let “F” denote frequentist
methods and “B” denote Bayesian methods.

Allocation
ratio

1:1

2:1

Treatment
arm 1 prior

Treatment
arm 2 prior

𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(6.5,3.5)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(3.5,6.5)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(26,14)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(14,26)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(6.5,3.5)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(3.5,6.5)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(26,14)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(14,26)

𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(20,20)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(20,20)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(20,20)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(20,20)

Sample size of
the control arm
F
B
153
153
153
154
152
157
115
110
114
111
94
97
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Threshold
F

1.64

B
0.949
0.961
0.924
0.981
0.807
0.949
0.956
0.93
0.972
0.83

Type I error
rate
F
B
0.0517
0.05
0.0503 0.048
0.0504
0.0509
0.05
0.0485
0.0496 0.0514
0.0523
0.0506

Power
F

0.848

0.85

B
0.843
0.842
0.841
0.841
0.856
0.846
0.856
0.846
0.855
0.861

Table 3.3b Results of the numerical study comparing frequentist and Bayesian methods for the
small treatment effect (𝑃1 = 0.7 and 𝑃2 = 0.4). Assuming that other parameters equal to those in
Table 3.3a.

Allocation
ratio

1:1

2:1

Treatment
arm 1 prior

Treatment
arm 2 prior

𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(8,2)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(2,8)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(16,4)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(4,16)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(8,2)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(2,8)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(16,4)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(4,16)

𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(10,10)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(10,10)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(10,10)
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(10,10)

Sample size of
the control arm
F
B
37
35
36
38
33
38
27
22
28
23
18
20
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Threshold
F

1.64

B
0.947
0.981
0.805
0.993
0.582
0.944
0.963
0.794
0.98
0.534

Type I error
rate
F
B
0.0544
0.0496
0.0505 0.0492
0.0492
0.0414
0.0477
0.0511
0.0521 0.0543
0.0458
0.051

Power
F

0.851

0.846

B
0.834
0.852
0.848
0.837
0.839
0.844
0.847
0.848
0.848
0.835

CHAPTER FOUR: SPECIFIC AIM 2
4.1 Introduction
Following the unified approach for frequentist and Bayesian methods in fixed-sample
clinical trials in Chapter 3, we propose another novel and theoretical-based unified approach for
group-sequential clinical trials in this chapter. Similarly, the unified approach aimed to achieve the
same type I and II error rates between frequentist and Bayesian methods for all analyses in group
sequential trials. These analyses include interim analyses and the final analysis. When a frequentist
design is given, the unified approach determines the Bayesian stopping boundaries and sample
size through a theoretical approach. When a Bayesian design is given, the unified approach
calculates the frequentist type I and II error rates, leading to a corresponding frequentist design.
Alpha spending functions for controlling the overall type I error rate and beta spending function
for controlling the overall type II error rate are used for the unified approach in Aim 2. Similar to
Aim 1, it is assumed that the group sequential trial still has two arms and binary outcomes. Beta
conjugate priors and decision making based on posterior probabilities for treatment difference are
used in Bayesian group sequential methods are used as well. Based on the approximate
distributions (3.1) and (3.2), a joint distribution of Bayesian posterior probabilities is derived.
Section 4.2 explained the novel unified approach for frequentist and Bayesian group sequential
methods. In Section 4.3, numerical results that show the unified approach achieves the goal under
various scenarios are present. The method is also applied to a trial application.

4.2 Methods
Assume the same parameterizations as in Chapter 3 and consider a group sequential trial
comparing an experimental treatment arm to a control treatment arm that has 𝐽 stages, that 𝐽 ≥ 2.
Let subscript 𝑗 denote the stage, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, where an analysis is carried out at the end of each
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stage. Let 𝑛𝑗 denote the accumulated number of patients at the end of the jth stage. The one-sided
hypotheses 𝐻0 : 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 ≤ ∆ against 𝐻1 : 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆ are tested at the end of each stage.
Further, let 𝑐𝐸,𝑗 and 𝑐𝐹,𝑗 denote the efficacy and the futility boundary for the jth stage,
respectively. The trial with both efficacy and futility boundaries shall continue if the test statistic
𝑇𝑗 at jth analysis, satisfying 𝑐𝐹,𝑗 < 𝑇𝑗 < 𝑐𝐸,𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽 − 1 . Otherwise, the trial will be
terminated early because the pre-specified stopping boundary has been crossed. The trial is stopped
for overwhelming benefits of the experimental treatment if 𝑇𝑗 > 𝑐𝐸,𝑗 , or it is stopped for sufficient
negative treatment effect if 𝑇𝑗 < 𝑐𝐹,𝑗 . The relationships among stopping boundaries, type I and II
error rates have been illustrated in Section 1.2.3.
Also, the expected sample size formula has been provided in Section 1.2.5, that is:
𝑗−1

𝐽−1

ESS = ∑ 𝑛𝑗 𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑗 < 𝑐𝐹,𝑗 ∪ 𝑇𝑗 > 𝑐𝐸,𝑗 ) + 𝑛𝐽 𝑃𝑟 (⋂ 𝑐𝐹,𝑗 ≤ 𝑇𝑗 ≤ 𝑐𝐸,𝑗 ).
𝑗=1

𝑗

Alpha and beta spending functions are considered for the unified approach. The alpha spent
at each interim analysis is a function of the information fraction, denoted as 𝜏. The information
fraction of the jth stage, 𝜏𝑗 , is defined as 𝑛𝑗 /𝑛𝐽 , where 𝑛𝐽 is the maximum sample size required in
the clinical trial. Further, three alpha spending functions introduced in Section 1.2.4 are considered
here:
(1). 𝛼1 (𝜏) = 2 − 2Φ(𝑍𝛼/2 /√𝜏),

O’Brien-Fleming

(2). 𝛼2 (𝜏) = 𝛼𝑙𝑛(1 + (𝑒 − 1)𝜏),

Pocock

(3). 𝛼3 (𝜏) = 𝛼𝜏 𝜃 , for 𝜃 > 0,

Power
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𝛼1 and the increments 𝛼2 − 𝛼1 , … , 𝛼𝑗 − 𝛼𝑗−1 are the type I error rate allowed for the
analysis at stage 1,2, … , 𝐽.Similarly, the above functions can be applied to spend beta by replacing
the 𝛼 parameter with 𝛽 parameter.
Same as Aim 1, conjugate prior distributions 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 ), 𝑖 = 1,2, for the experimental arm and
the control arm is considered. However, the posterior distribution is updated at every stage. At the
end of the 𝑗th stage, 𝜋𝑖𝑗 follows a beta posterior distribution 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑎𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖𝑗 , 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖𝑗 − 𝑦𝑖𝑗 ), where
𝑛𝑖𝑗 and 𝑦𝑖𝑗 are the number of patients and the number of patients with successful outcomes for the
ith arm by the jth stage, and 𝑛𝑗 = ∑2𝑖 𝑛𝑖𝑗 . The test statistic, 𝑇𝑗 at the jth analysis, is the posterior
probability that the experimental arm is superior to the control arm, 𝑇𝑗 = 𝑃𝑗 (𝜋1𝑗 − 𝜋2𝑗 > ∆).
Similar to classical group sequential procedures, the trial will be terminated for sufficient
evidences of efficacy when 𝑃𝑗 (𝜋1𝑗 − 𝜋2𝑗 > ∆) is greater than the 𝑐𝐸𝑗 , and will be terminated for
futility when the posterior probability is smaller than 𝑐𝐹𝑗 . Though type I and II error rates are not
naturally defined in Bayesian methodologies, Monte Carlo simulations can be used to calculate
type I and II error rates. For instance, to calculate the type I error rate for a Bayesian group
sequential trials with double boundaries at the jth stage, L samples are drawn from the Bayesian
posterior distributions under the null distribution, and then calculate the proportion of samples that
the trial is stopped for efficacy:
𝐿

𝑗−1

𝛼𝑗 = ∑ 𝐼𝐻0 (⋂ 𝑐𝐹,𝑗 ∗ ≤ 𝑃𝑗 ∗,𝑙 (𝜋1𝑗 ∗,𝑙 − 𝜋2𝑗 ∗,𝑙 > ∆) ≤ 𝑐𝐸,𝑗∗ ⋂𝑃𝑗,𝑙 (𝜋1𝑗,𝑙 − 𝜋2𝑗,𝑙 > ∆) > 𝑐𝐸,𝑗 ) /𝐿,
𝑙=1

𝑗∗

where 𝐼(. ) is an indicator function and the overall type I error rate is the summation of
𝛼1 , 𝛼2 , … , 𝛼𝐽 . Similarly, the type II error rate estimated from Monte Carlo simulations is defined
as follows:
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𝐿

𝑗−1

𝛽𝑗 = ∑ 𝐼𝐻1 (⋂ 𝑐𝐹,𝑗∗ ≤ 𝑃𝑗 ∗,𝑙 (𝜋1𝑗 ∗ ,𝑙 − 𝜋2𝑗 ∗,𝑙 > ∆) ≤ 𝑐𝐸,𝑗 ∗ ⋂𝑃𝑗,𝑙 (𝜋1𝑗,𝑙 − 𝜋2𝑗,𝑙 > ∆) < 𝑐𝐹,𝑗 ) /𝐿,
𝑙=1

𝑗∗

and the overall type II error rate is the summation of 𝛽1 , 𝛽2 , … , 𝛽𝐽 . Nevertheless, those simulationbased calculations cost considerable amounts of time, especially at the designing stage when
clinical trialists want to evaluate a number of Bayesian stopping boundaries.
Therefore, a more efficient way is to derive a theoretical method to calculate the type I and
II error rates directly from the posterior distributions of 𝑇1 , …, 𝑇𝐽 . Notably, the posterior
distributions of 𝑇1 , …, 𝑇𝐽 are highly skewed and have no closed-form solutions. However, in
Chapter 3 we have showed that the standard normal quantile transformation of the posterior
probability 𝑇. , denoted as 𝜂. , can be well approximated by a normal distribution in two-arm fixed
sample trials with binary endpoints, when the sample size is sufficient large. As such, in groupsequential methods, the distribution of 𝜂𝑗 = Φ(𝑇𝑗 ) can also be approximated by a normal
distribution, that is,
𝑛1𝑗 𝑃2 (1 − 𝑃2 )
𝜂𝑗 ~𝑁

𝜇1𝑗 − 𝜇2𝑗 − ∆

,

𝜇1𝑗 (1 − 𝜇1𝑗 )
𝜇2𝑗 (1 − 𝜇2𝑗 )
√
+
( 𝑛1𝑗 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 + 1 𝑛2𝑗 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 + 1

(𝑛1𝑗 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 )

2

+

𝑛2𝑗 𝑃2 (1 − 𝑃2 )
(𝑛2𝑗 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 )

2

𝜇1𝑗 (1 − 𝜇1𝑗 )
𝜇2𝑗 (1 − 𝜇2𝑗 )
+
𝑛1𝑗 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 + 1 𝑛2𝑗 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 + 1

, (4.1)
)

where 𝜇1𝑗 = (𝑛1𝑗 𝑃1 + 𝑎1 )/(𝑛1𝑗 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 ) and 𝜇2𝑗 = (𝑛2𝑗 𝑃2 + 𝑎2 )/(𝑛2𝑗 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 ). Similar
to frequentist group sequential clinical trials(Jennison & Turnbull, 2000), the normal
approximation works well because sample sizes are enough large. Note, (𝜂1 , 𝜂2 , … , 𝜂𝐽 ) follows a
multivariate normal distribution(Jennison & Turnbull, 2000). The covariance between the
transformed variables at any two stages 𝑗1 and 𝑗2 , 1 ≤ 𝑗1 ≤ 𝑗2 ≤ 𝐽, is

74

𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜂𝑗1 , 𝜂𝑗2 ) = √

2
𝜎𝑗2 𝜎𝑗2 𝜎𝐹𝑗
1

2

2

2
𝜎𝐹𝑗

, 1 ≤ 𝑗1 ≤ 𝑗2 ≤ 𝐽,

1

2
where 𝜎𝐹𝑗
=
1

2
𝑛1𝑗1 𝑃1 (1 − 𝑃1 )/𝑛1𝑗1 2 + 𝑛2𝑗1 𝑃2 (1 − 𝑃2 )/𝑛2𝑗1 2 and 𝜎𝐹𝑗
=
2

𝑛1𝑗2 𝑃1 (1 − 𝑃1 )/

𝑛1𝑗2 2 + 𝑛2𝑗2 𝑃2 (1 − 𝑃2 )/𝑛2𝑗2 2 . A proof for the covariance is shown below.
Proof 4.1
Suppose there is a frequentist group sequential design with the same 𝑃𝑖 , 𝛼, 𝛽 and 𝑛𝑖𝑗 , 𝑖 = 1,2; 𝑗 =
1, … , 𝐽. Let 𝑍𝑗1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑍𝑗2 denote the standard test statistics at the 𝑗1 𝑡ℎ and the 𝑗2 𝑡ℎ stages, 1 ≤ 𝑗1 <
𝑗2 ≤ 𝐽. The covariance between 𝑍𝑗1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑍𝑗2 has been derived by Jennison and Turnbull (2001),
that:
2
2
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍𝑗1 , 𝑍𝑗2 ) = √𝜎𝐹𝑗
/𝜎𝐹𝑗
.
2
1

Further, write covariance of 𝜂𝑗1 and 𝜂𝑗2 as the covariance of functions of 𝑍𝑗1 and 𝑍𝑗2 :
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜂𝑗1 , 𝜂𝑗2 ) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑍𝑗1 𝜎𝑗1 + 𝜇𝜂𝑗1 , 𝑍𝑗2 𝜎𝑗2 + 𝜇𝜂𝑗2 ) = 𝜎𝑗1 𝜎𝑗2 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍𝑗1 , 𝑍𝑗2 ).
2
2
Replace 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍𝑗1 , 𝑍𝑗2 ) with √𝜎𝐹𝑗
/𝜎𝐹𝑗
, the covariance of 𝜂𝑗1 and 𝜂𝑗2 is obtained as:
2
1

𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜂𝑗1 , 𝜂𝑗2 ) = √

2
𝜎𝑗2 𝜎𝑗2 𝜎𝐹𝑗
1

2

2

2
𝜎𝐹𝑗

.

1

The resulting multivariate normal distribution allows us to calculate Bayesian type I and II error
rates using a numerical approach. Bayesian type I and II error rates at the jth stage are defined as:
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𝑗−1

𝛼𝑗 = 𝑃𝑟𝐻0 (⋂ Φ(𝑐𝐹,𝑗∗ ) ≤ 𝜂𝑗 ∗ ≤ Φ(𝑐𝐸,𝑗 ∗ )⋂ 𝜂𝑗 > Φ(𝑐𝐸,𝑗 )),

(4.2)

𝑗∗

𝑗−1

𝛽𝑗 = 𝑃𝑟𝐻1 (⋂ Φ(𝑐𝐹,𝑗 ∗ ) ≤ 𝜂𝑗 ∗ ≤ Φ(𝑐𝐸,𝑗∗ )⋂ 𝜂𝑗 < Φ(𝑐𝐹,𝑗 )).

(4.3)

𝑗∗

With the formulae to calculate Bayesian type I and II error rates, it is possible to obtain the
same type I and II error rates for each analysis for frequentist and Bayesian group sequential
methods. Let subscript F denote parameters for frequentist methods and subscript B denote
parameters for Bayesian methods. Unification between frequentist and Bayesian methods is
achieved by solving the following equations for parameters of one method when parameters of the
other are given:
𝛼𝐹,1 = 𝛼𝐵,1 and 𝛼𝐹,𝑗+1 − 𝛼𝐹,𝑗 = 𝛼𝐵,𝑗+1 − 𝛼𝐵,𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽 − 1.

(4.4)

𝛽𝐹,1 = 𝛽𝐵,1 , and 𝛽𝐹,𝑗+1 − 𝛽𝐹,𝑗 = 𝛽𝐵,𝑗+1 − 𝛽𝐵,𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽 − 1.

(4.5)

𝛼𝐹,1 and 𝛽𝐹,1 are type I and II error rates distributed at the jth analysis using spending functions.
Note, there are several other methods than spending functions to define stopping boundaries, e.g.
boundary computation for triangular test(Whitehead & Stratton, 1983) and the recursive numerical
algorithm proposed by Armitage et al.(P Armitage et al., 1969) But it is beyond the scope of this
paper and will not be discussed in detail. But the same unification results can always be achieved
between frequentist and Bayesian group sequential methods as long as equations (4.4) and (4.5)
are satisfied. Notably, the stopping probability also becomes the same for frequentist and Bayesian
methods for each analysis if (4.4) and (4.5) are both met.
If a Bayesian group sequential design is given, corresponding frequentist group sequential
methods to achieve the same type I and II error rates are derived using the unified approach. For
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instance, in a Bayesian group sequential trial with double boundaries, 𝛼𝐵,𝑗 and 𝛽𝐵,𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽,
can be calculated using equations (4.2) and (4.3). Frequentist stopping boundaries and sample size
are derived for given 𝛼𝐹,1 ,…, 𝛼𝐹,𝐽 and 𝛽𝐹,1 , … , 𝛽𝐹,𝑗 , that satisfy equations (4.4) and (4.5). Jennison
and Turnbull(Jennison & Turnbull, 2000) demonstrated how to determine stopping boundaries and
the maximum sample size for frequentist group sequential methods.
Likewise, corresponding Bayesian group sequential methods are derived when a
frequentist group sequential design is given. Similar to frequentist group sequential methods,
Bayesian stopping boundaries are computed sequentially. However, detailed steps to determine
Bayesian stopping boundaries considering prior influences may differ from frequentist steps. In
equation (4.1), the mean of 𝜂𝑗 under the null contains the sample size parameter and is not centered
at zero if informative priors are applied. Thus, the Bayesian sample size is estimated
simultaneously when calculating Bayesian stopping boundaries. Algorithms for a single Bayesian
boundary and double Bayesian boundaries computations are illustrated as follows.
In group sequential methods with a single boundary, only one of efficacy and futility
boundaries are specified, while the other boundaries are not defined. Resulting trials are stopped
either for efficacy or futility. Use efficacy boundaries as an example, alpha spending functions are
applied to control the overall type I error of group sequential trials. The relationship among the
alpha spent, the efficacy boundary and the Bayesian sample size at the first stage is established
below:
∞

𝑃𝑟H0 (𝜂1 ≥ Φ(𝑐𝐸,1 )) = ∫ 𝑓(𝜂1 )𝑑𝜂1 = 𝛼(𝜏1 ),
𝑐𝐸,1
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(4.6)

where 𝑓(𝜂1 ) is the marginal probability density function of 𝜂1 . For the following stages, the
increment of the alpha spent between 𝑗th and (𝑗 + 1)th stages should equal to the integral of the
multivariate normal distribution of 𝜂1 , … 𝜂𝑗+1 .
𝑃𝑟𝐻0 (𝜂1 < Φ(𝑐𝐸,1 ), … , 𝜂𝑗−1 < Φ(𝑐𝐸,𝑗−1 ), 𝜂𝑗 ≥ Φ(𝑐𝐸,𝑗 )) =
𝑐𝐸,1

∞

∫−∞ … ∫𝑐

𝐸,𝑗

(4.7)

𝑓(𝜂1 , . . , 𝜂𝑗 )𝑑𝜂1 … 𝑑𝜂𝑗 = 𝛼(𝜏𝑗 ) − 𝛼(𝜏𝑗−1 ), 𝑗 = 2, … , 𝐽.

Bayesian power is defined as:
1 − 𝛽 = 𝑃𝑟H1 (⋃𝑗𝐽 𝜂𝑗 > Φ(𝑐𝐸,𝑗 )).

(4.8)

The algorithm to compute the efficacy boundaries and Bayesian sample size works as
follows:
1. Calculate the type I error rate spent at stage j in the Bayesian group sequential method, that
is, 𝛼𝐵 (𝜏1 ), 𝛼𝐵 (𝜏2 ) − 𝛼𝐵 (𝜏1 ), … , 𝛼𝐵 (𝜏𝐽 ) − 𝛼𝐵 (𝜏𝐽−1 ). In the unified approach, the type I
error rate spent at each stage in the Bayesian method is set to the same as that in the
frequentist method, as stated in equation (4).
2. Select a possible range of maximum sample size from 𝑛0 to 𝑛𝑀 , 𝑛0 ≤ 𝑛𝑀 , denoted as
{𝑛0 , 𝑛1 , … , 𝑛𝑀 }. Choose an initial value of the maximum sample size, e.g. 𝑛 = 𝑛0 .
3. Compute the efficacy boundaries for the first interim analysis, 𝑐𝐸,1, by plugging sample
size parameter 𝑛 into equation (4.6). Solve 𝑐𝐸,2 ,…, 𝑐𝐸,J sequentially using equation (4.7).
4. Compute the power 1 − 𝛽 ∗ , using the equation (4.8).
5. Since the power is a monotone function of the sample size when holding the type I error
rate fixed. Iterate over values in {𝑛0 , 𝑛1 , … , 𝑛𝑀 }, repeat steps 3 and 4 until the difference
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between 1 − 𝛽 ∗ and to 1 − 𝛽 is smaller than some pre-specified margin of error, 𝜀, that is,
|𝛽 ∗ − 𝛽| < 𝜀. 𝜀 is a small number, i.e. 1𝑒 − 4. The final n is the maximum sample size
and 𝑐𝐸,1, 𝑐𝐸,2 ,…, 𝑐𝐸,𝐽 are corresponding efficacy boundaries.
Optimizations such as bisection methods can be implemented to reduce the time to search for the
maximum sample size parameter n.
The bisection method proceeds as follows:

1) For the possible range of maximum sample size, {𝑛0 , 𝑛1 , … , 𝑛𝑀 }, define the minimum
value as MIN = 𝑛0 and the maximum value as MAX = 𝑛𝑀 . Define the midpoint as the
mean of MIN and MAX rounded down to the nearest integer, that is, MID =
floor(1⁄2 (𝑛0 + 𝑛𝑀 )). Compute Bayesian powers 1 − 𝛽 ∗ in step 4 for MAX and MIN,
respectively. Calculate differences between resulting Bayesian powers and the desired
power 1 − 𝛽 for MAX and MIN, denoted as 𝐷(𝑀𝐴𝑋 ) and 𝐷(𝑀𝐼𝑁). Note, 𝐷(𝑀𝐴𝑋 )
and 𝐷(𝑀𝐼𝑁) should have opposite signs.
2) Compute the difference between Bayesian power calculated in step 4 using 𝑀𝐼𝐷 and
the desired power, denoted as 𝐷(𝑀𝐼𝐷 ).
3) If 𝐷(𝑀𝐼𝐷 ) has the opposite sign of 𝐷(𝑀𝐴𝑋 ), update the MIN as MIN = MID + 1 .
Otherwise, update the MAX as MAX = MID − 1 . Next, the new MID value is updated as
floor(1⁄2 (𝑛0 + 𝑛𝑀 )).
4) Repeat step 2 and 3 until MAX  MIN . The final maximum sample size is n = MIN.
Steps of calculating for futility boundaries are very much the same as for efficacy boundaries. The
few changes in steps for futility boundaries computation are to replace the alpha spending function
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with the beta spending function and search for the maximum sample size until the overall type I
error rate 𝑃𝑟H0 (⋂𝑗𝐽−1 𝜂𝑗 ≥ Φ(𝑐𝐹,𝑗 ) ∩ 𝜂𝐽 ≥ Φ(𝑐𝐹,𝐽 )) converges to the desired type I error rate.
2.5. Bayesian Group Sequential Methods with Double Boundaries
Many group sequential trials implement both efficacy and futility boundaries. Alpha and beta
spending functions are applied to maintain the overall type I and II error rates for trials. Stopping
boundary values for the first interim analysis are computed using the following equations:
∞

𝑃𝑟𝐻0 (𝜂1 ≥ Φ(𝑐𝐸,1 )) = ∫ 𝑓(𝜂1 )𝑑𝜂1 = 𝛼(𝜏1 ),

(4.9)

𝑐𝐸,1
𝑐𝐹,1

𝑃𝑟𝐻1 (𝜂1 < Φ(𝑐𝐹,1 )) = ∫ 𝑓(𝜂1 )𝑑𝜂1 = 𝛽(𝜏1 ).

(4.10)

−∞

Notably, there are two different ways to calculate the following boundary values. The first
approach binds efficacy boundaries with futility boundaries. That is, the trial is terminated when
any futility boundary has been crossed. Following equations are used to calculate efficacy and
futility boundaries for the jth stage, 𝑗 = 2, … , 𝐽.
𝑃𝑟𝐻0 (Φ(𝑐𝐹,1 ) < 𝜂1 < Φ(𝑐𝐸,1 ), … , Φ(𝑐𝐹,𝑗−1 ) < 𝜂𝑗−1 < Φ(𝑐𝐸,𝑗−1 ), 𝜂𝑗
≥ Φ(𝑐𝐸,𝑗 ))
(4.11)
𝑐𝐸,1

∞

= ∫ … ∫ 𝑓(𝜂1 , . . , 𝜂𝑗 )𝑑𝜂1 … 𝑑𝜂𝑗 = 𝛼(𝜏𝑗 ) − 𝛼(𝜏𝑗−1 ),
𝑐𝐹,1

𝑐𝐸,𝑗

𝑃𝑟𝐻1 (Φ(𝑐𝐹,1 ) < 𝜂1 < Φ(𝑐𝐸,1 ), … , Φ(𝑐𝐹,𝑗−1 ) < 𝜂𝑗−1 < Φ(𝑐𝐸,𝑗−1 ), 𝜂𝑗
(4.12)
≥ Φ(𝑐𝐸,𝑗 ))
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𝑐

∞

𝐹,1

𝐸,𝑗

= ∫𝑐 𝐸,1… ∫𝑐

𝑓(𝜂1 , . . , 𝜂𝑗 )𝑑𝜂1 … 𝑑𝜂𝑗 = 𝛽(𝜏𝑗 ) − 𝛽(𝜏𝑗−1 ).

And the power is defined as
𝑗−1

𝐽

1 − 𝛽 = 1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑟𝐻1 (⋂ Φ(𝑐𝐹,𝑗∗ ) ≤ 𝜂𝑗 ∗ ≤ Φ(𝑐𝐸,𝑗 ∗ )⋂ 𝜂𝑗 < Φ(𝑐𝐹,𝑗 )).

(4.13)

𝑗∗

𝑗=1

Oppositely, the second approach considers unbinding futility boundaries. The trial can continue
even if a futility boundary has been crossed. In this approach, steps to obtain efficacy boundaries
are the same as equation (4.7) in the single efficacy boundary calculation. While futility boundaries
computation is the same as equation (4.12).
The algorithm to compute binding stopping boundaries and the maximum sample size in
Bayesian group sequential methods work as follows:
1. Calculate the type I and II error rates spent at stage j, that is, 𝛼𝐵 (𝜏1 ), 𝛼𝐵 (𝜏2 ) −
𝛼𝐵 (𝜏1 ), … , 𝛼𝐵 (𝜏𝐽 ) − 𝛼𝐵 (𝜏𝐽−1 ) and 𝛽𝐵 (𝜏1 ), 𝛽𝐵 (𝜏2 ) − 𝛽𝐵 (𝜏1 ), … , 𝛽𝐵 (𝜏𝐽 ) − 𝛽𝐵 (𝜏𝐽−1 ) . In
the unified approach, type I and II error rates spent at each stage in the Bayesian method is
set to the same as that in the frequentist method, as stated in equation (4.4) and (4.5).
2. Select a possible range of maximum sample size from 𝑛0 to 𝑛𝑀 , 𝑛0 ≤ 𝑛𝑀 , denoted as
{𝑛0 , 𝑛1 , … , 𝑛𝑀 }. Choose an initial value of the maximum sample size, e.g. 𝑛 = 𝑛0 .
3. Compute efficacy and futility boundaries for the first interim analysis 𝑐𝐸,1 and 𝑐𝐹,1 by
plugging

sample

size

parameter 𝑛 into

equation

(4.9)

and

(4.10).

𝑐𝐸,2 , 𝑐𝐹,2…, 𝑐𝐸,𝐽 sequentially using equation (4.11) and (4.12), set 𝑐𝐹,𝐽 = 𝑐𝐸,𝐽 .
4. Compute the power using equation (4.13).
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Solve

5. Since the power is a monotone function of the sample size when holding the type I error
rate fixed. Iterate over values in {𝑛0 , 𝑛1 , … , 𝑛𝑀 }, repeat steps 3 and 4 until the difference
between 1 − 𝛽 ∗ and to 1 − 𝛽 is smaller than some pre-specified margin of error, 𝜀, that is,
|𝛽 ∗ − 𝛽| < 𝜀. 𝜀 is a small number, i.e. 1𝑒 − 4. The final n is the maximum sample size.
𝑐𝐸,1, 𝑐𝐸,2,…, 𝑐𝐸,𝐽 and 𝑐𝐹1 , 𝑐𝐹,2 ,…, 𝑐𝐹,𝐽 are corresponding efficacy and futility boundaries.
For non-binding boundaries, step 3 is changed to compute efficacy boundaries 𝑐𝐸,1 and 𝑐𝐹,1 using
equations (4.7) and (4.12). Similarly, using the bisection algorithm can reduce the computation
time to obtain the maximum sample size.

4.3 Results
First, the stopping boundaries are evaluated with different prior specifications. Figure 4.1
shows efficacy boundaries for Bayesian group sequential trials assuming single boundaries. It is
assumed that 𝑃1 = 0.65 and 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, 𝛼 = 0.05 and 𝛽 = 0.2. O’Brien-Fleming
boundary, Pocock boundary, and power boundaries with 𝜃 = 1, 2 are compared under three
different Bayesian prior combinations for treatment arms, including a non-informative prior, an
optimistic prior and a pessimistic prior. Beta(1, 1) distributions are applied to both treatment arms
as non-informative priors. For the optimistic prior, it is considered Beta(13, 7) for the
experimental arm and Beta(10, 10) for the control arm, so that the prior favors the experimental
arm. For the pessimistic prior, Beta(5, 15) and Beta(10, 10) are assigned to the experimental
treatment and control treatment, respectively. Thus, the prior assumes a treatment effect is unlikely
to be observed. Consider three analyses are planned for the trial, two of which are interim analysis
to be conducted when 1/3 and 1/2 patients are enrolled. The information fraction, 𝜏, is used for
drawing the x-axis in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.2 show efficacy and futility stopping boundaries
assuming binding double boundaries. The efficacy boundary and the futility boundary are either a
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Pocock type of stopping boundaries, or an O’Brien-Fleming type of stopping boundaries. Pocock
and O’Brien-Fleming boundaries are chosen because they are commonly used in group-sequential
clinical trials. It is assumed that Figure 4.2 uses the same 𝑃1 , 𝑃2 , 𝑟, ∆, 𝛼 and 𝛽 as in Figure 4.1.
When different priors are used, the null distribution and the alternative distribution may
shift to satisfy the type I and type II probabilities. Therefore, Bayesian stopping boundary values
vary for different Bayesian priors. In both figures, it can be seen that the efficacy boundary values
are more rigorous for optimistic priors compared to those for pessimistic priors. Similar to
frequentist stopping boundaries, O’Brien-Fleming and power with 𝜃 = 2 efficacy boundaries are
more stringent at early stages compared to Pocock and power with 𝜃 = 1 boundaries in Figure
4.1. The changing patterns for four types of efficacy boundaries are similar for non-informative
prior and optimistic prior in Figure 4.1. While it is interesting to find efficacy boundaries have a
larger variation between stages for pessimistic prior than other two types of priors. Also, values of
Pocock and power with 𝜃 = 1 boundaries increases much from the first interim analysis to the
second interim analysis. For double boundaries case in Figure 4.2, the futility boundaries for the
optimistic prior is higher than that of the non-informative prior, and the futility boundaries for the
pessimistic prior is lower than that of the non-informative prior. Similar to Figure 4.1 when
pessimistic prior is applied, stopping boundaries values vary much between stages and the Pocock
efficacy boundaries increase from the first interim analysis to the second interim analysis. In
addition, the trial is less likely to stop early using O’Brien-Fleming futility boundaries than Pocock
futility boundaries, especially when pessimistic prior is used. Overall, both figures indicate
Bayesian prior as well as the type of stopping boundaries should be carefully evaluated and chosen
by clinical trialists, as the values and patterns of resulting stopping boundaries can be quite
different.
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Furthermore, Bayesian type I and II error rates and stopping probabilities are evaluated
under the 𝐻1 for examples in Figure 4.1 and 4.2. Simulations are used to verify whether Bayesian
type I and II error rates, as well as stopping probabilities are the same as desired frequentist values.
Let 𝛼̃𝑗 and 𝛽̃𝑗 denote type I and II error rates at the jth analysis. The overall type I and II rates are
̃
̃
denoted as 𝛼̃ and 𝛽̃, that 𝛼̃ = ∑3𝑗 𝛼̃𝑗 and 𝛽̃ = ∑3𝑗 𝛽̃𝑗 . Let 𝑆𝑃
𝐸𝑗 and 𝑆𝑃𝐹𝑗 denote simulated stopping
probabilities under the 𝐻1 for efficacy and futility at the jth stage, respectively. Note, the actual
Bayesian values, especially the early stage stopping probabilities may slightly deviate from the
desired frequentist values due to the uncertainty of simulations and rounding up during stopping
boundaries and sample size determinations. Results for simulated type I and II error rates based on
single efficacy boundaries and binding double boundaries are summarized in Table 4.1 and 4.2;
results for stopping probabilities are shown in Table 4.3 and 4.4.
Table 4.1 shows simulated Bayesian type I and II error rates for each analysis and overall
rates are consistently matched with desired frequentist values in the single efficacy boundaries
case. Compared to previous methods proposed by Zhu et al. (Zhu & Yu, 2015) and Shi and Yin(Shi
& Yin, 2019), our unified approach is insensitive to the prior choice, therefore strictly control both
type I and II error rates for Bayesian methods. For binding doublestopping boundaries in Table
4.2, results are generally similar to the single efficacy boundaries. The Bayesian type II error rate
generated at each analysis is close to the desired value of beta-spending functions, which means
error spending function can be implemented to control type II error rate in Bayesian methods.
As shown in Table 4.3, frequentist and Bayesian stopping probabilities for efficacy under
the 𝐻1 are very close when non-informative priors are used in the single boundary case.
Nevertheless, Bayesian stopping probabilities for efficacy can be different from frequentist
probabilities when informative prior distributions are applied. This is because that the distribution
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of 𝜂 under the 𝐻1 and stopping boundary values change with respect to prior distributions. As a
result, stopping probabilities can also vary in Bayesian methods given different prior distributions.
For the double boundaries case in Table 4.4, however, Bayesian and frequentist stopping
probabilities are similar for all non-informative and informative priors. This is because both
Bayesian type I and II error rates spent at each analysis are set to the same as frequentist values. It
suggests that the proposed unified approach can produce the same stopping probabilities under the
𝐻1 between frequentist and Bayesian methods when both efficacy and futility boundaries are
present.
Finally, the unified approach is applied to a group sequential clinical trial to demonstrate
its application. Suppose there is a clinical trial designed to evaluate the therapeutic benefit of the
intensive systolic blood-pressure treatment compared to the standard systolic blood-pressure
treatment. The primary outcome is the proportion of patients who do not have severe disability or
death at 3 months. Consider that the trial has a 1:1 allocation ratio and a single efficacy boundary.
To preserve a nominal significance level at the final analysis that is close to that of a fixed-sample
design, O’Brien-Fleming type alpha spending function are used to determine efficacy boundary
values. Furthermore, assume there are no covariates or interaction terms to be controlled for
evaluating the primary outcome. The overall type I error rate is set to be 0.05 and the desired power
is 85% for assumed a 20% increase of primary outcome, from 0.4 to 0.6, in the experimental
treatment group. We evaluate the efficacy stopping boundary values (𝑐𝐸 ), maximum sample sizes
(MSS) and expected sample sizes (ESS) under the alternative hypothesis for two-stages (an interim
analysis carried out when 1/2 patients are enrolled), three-stages (interim analyses carried out when
1/3 and 1/2 patients are enrolled) and four-stages (interim analyses carried out when 1/3, 1/2 and
2/3 patients are enrolled). Originally, the trial is designed using frequentist group sequential
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methods. Bayesian group sequential methods are derived using the unified approach. Bayesian
methods are evaluated under three different prior specifications: a non-informative prior
(Beta(1,1) for both treatment arms), an optimistic prior (Beta(30, 10) for the experimental arm
and (Beta(20, 20) for the control arm) and a pessimistic prior (Beta(16, 24) for the experimental
arm and (Beta(20, 20) for the control arm).
Corresponding boundary values, sample size results are summarized in Table 4.5 and
boundaries are also plotted in Figure 4.3. For boundary values, we use a standard normal scale for
frequentist boundaries and posterior probabilities for Bayesian methods. When non-informative
prior distributions are used for Bayesian group sequential methods, the Bayesian maximum sample
size and expected sample size are the same as frequentist methods. The optimistic prior reduces
the maximum sample sizes needed for Bayesian methods compared to frequentist methods,
whereas the pessimistic prior does not increase maximum sample sizes much compared to
frequentist methods. For three-stages and four-stages scenarios, optimistic priors reduce the
expected sample size in Bayesian methods compared to frequentist methods as well. However, for
the two-stage scenario, the Bayesian method with the optimistic prior has a larger expected sample
size than the frequentist method. This is due to the fact that Bayesian stopping boundaries are very
high and the stopping probability is very small at the interim analysis for the two-stage scenario
(See Figure 4.3). The pessimistic prior requires slightly more expected sample sizes than
frequentist methods. Notably, Bayesian stopping boundary values for pessimistic priors are much
smaller than those for non-informative priors and optimistic priors (See Figure 4.3). Overall,
optimistic priors do not always reduce the expected sample size in the unified approach and
pessimistic priors may not increase the maximum sample size and expected sample size much.
Clinical trialists should choose from frequentist and Bayesian methods by carefully evaluating the
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operating characteristics, e.g. the number of interim analyses and Bayesian priors, when designing
a group-sequential trial.

4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, a novel unified approach for frequentist and Bayesian methods in one-sided twoarm group sequential clinical trials with binary outcomes is developed. The approach unifies
frequentist and Bayesian group sequential methods on type I and II error rates. Additionally, the
approach unifies stopping probabilities for frequentist and Bayesian group sequential methods with
double boundaries. It is assumed that beta conjugate priors are used for treatment arms, and
Bayesian decisions depend on posterior probabilities of the difference between the experimental
arm and the control arm. The approach utilizes relationships among type I and II error rates, the
stopping boundaries, and multivariate distributions of test statistics under the null and alternative
hypotheses to achieve unification. Those relationships are well studied in classical group
sequential methods(Jennison & Turnbull, 2000). Therefore, the unified approach is intuitive and
can be applied in group sequential clinical trials. The approach also helps with the uptake of
Bayesian methods into clinical trials as it reduces the computation and generates the same type I
and II error rates as frequentist methods do.
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4.5 Appendix

Figure 4.1 Bayesian single efficacy boundary values under three different prior specifications. It
is assumed that 𝑃1 = 0.65 and 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, 𝛼 = 0.05 and 𝛽 = 0.2.
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Figure 4.2 Bayesian double boundaries values under three different prior specifications. It is
assumed that 𝑃1 = 0.65 and 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, 𝛼 = 0.05 and 𝛽 = 0.2.
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Figure 4.3 Bayesian efficacy stopping boundary values for a specified number of stages and prior
distribution in the trial example. It is assumed that 𝑃1 = 0.6 and 𝑃2 = 0.4, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, 𝛼 = 0.05
and 𝛽 = 0.15. O’Brien-Fleming type alpha-spending function are used for determining stopping
boundaries.
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Table 4.1 Type I and II error rates for frequentist and Bayesian group sequential methods with a
single efficacy boundary. Bayesian type I and II error rates are simulated under three different
prior specifications. It is assumed that 𝑃1 = 0.65 and 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, 𝛼 = 0.05 and 𝛽 =
0.2.

Boundaries
O’BrienFleming

Pocock

Power, 𝜃 = 1

Power, 𝜃 = 2

Prior for
Prior for
Treatment
Control
Desired Frequentist Values
Beta(1, 1)
Beta(1,1)
Beta(13, 7)
Beta(10, 10)
Beta(5, 15)
Beta(10, 10)
Desired Frequentist Values
Beta(1, 1)
Beta(1,1)
Beta(13, 7)
Beta(10, 10)
Beta(5, 15)
Beta(10, 10)
Desired Frequentist Values
Beta(1, 1)
Beta(1,1)
Beta(13, 7)
Beta(10, 10)
Beta(5, 15)
Beta(10, 10)
Desired Frequentist Values
Beta(1, 1)
Beta(1,1)
Beta(13, 7)
Beta(10, 10)
Beta(5, 15)
Beta(10, 10)
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𝛼
̃1

𝛼
̃2

𝛼
̃3

𝛼̃

𝛽̃

0.000687
0.00072
0.000878
0.0008
0.0226
0.0273
0.0218
0.0207
0.0167
0.0161
0.0160
0.0177
0.00556
0.00526
0.00644
0.00456

0.00489
0.00434
0.00498
0.0051
0.00836
0.0075
0.0099
0.0088
0.00833
0.00911
0.0103
0.00662
0.00694
0.00762
0.0066
0.00928

0.0444
0.044
0.0439
0.0460
0.019
0.0184
0.0165
0.0224
0.025
0.024
0.024
0.0257
0.0375
0.0344
0.0421
0.0337

0.05
0.0491
0.0481
0.0519
0.05
0.053
0.0482
0.0519
0.05
0.0492
0.0503
0.050
0.05
0.0473
0.0551
0.0475

0.2
0.196
0.209
0.205
0.2
0.2
0.205
0.198
0.2
0.2
0.21
0.197
0.2
0.196
0.201
0.212

Table 4.2 Type I and II error rates for frequentist and Bayesian group sequential methods with
binding double boundaries. Bayesian type I and II error rates are simulated under three different
prior specifications. It is assumed that 𝑃1 = 0.65 and 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, 𝛼 = 0.05 and 𝛽 =
0.2.

Boundaries
O’BrienFleming –
O’BrienFleming
O’BrienFleming –
Pocock
Pocock –
O’BrienFleming

Pocock –
Pocock

Prior for
Prior for
Treatment
Control
Desired Frequentist Values
Beta(1, 1)
Beta(1,1)
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10)
Beta(5, 15) Beta(10, 10)
Desired Frequentist Values
Beta(1, 1)
Beta(1,1)
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10)
Beta(5, 15) Beta(10, 10)
Desired Frequentist Values
Beta(1, 1)
Beta(1,1)
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10)
Beta(5, 15) Beta(10, 10)
Desired Frequentist Values
Beta(1, 1)
Beta(1,1)
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10)
Beta(5, 15) Beta(10, 10)

𝛼
̃1

𝛼
̃2

𝛼
̃3

𝛼̃

̃1
𝛽

̃2
𝛽

̃3
𝛽

𝛽̃

0.000687
0.000788
0.0008
0.0008
0.000687
0.0006
0.0007
0.00058
0.0226
0.0213
0.0213
0.0226
0.0226
0.0279
0.0246
0.0276

0.00489
0.00522
0.00468
0.00526
0.00489
0.00532
0.00566
0.00532
0.00836
0.00808
0.00808
0.00876
0.00836
0.00624
0.0092
0.00574

0.0444
0.0436
0.0434
0.0456
0.0444
0.046
0.0431
0.046
0.019
0.0211
0.0211
0.0198
0.019
0.0216
0.0181
0.0212

0.05
0.0496
0.0489
0.0517
0.05
0.0519
0.0495
0.0519
0.05
0.0505
0.0505
0.0512
0.05
0.0558
0.0529
0.0545

0.0264
0.0264
0.0231
0.022
0.0906
0.101
0.101
0.101
0.0264
0.0308
0.0308
0.029
0.0906
0.0826
0.107
0.0819

0.0435
0.0445
0.0563
0.0443
0.0335
0.0305
0.0251
0.0315
0.0435
0.0394
0.0394
0.0386
0.0335
0.0341
0.0349
0.0355

0.131
0.136
0.127
0.116
0.0759
0.0732
0.0768
0.0733
0.131
0.123
0.123
0.118
0.0759
0.0635
0.0616
0.071

0.2
0.207
0.207
0.182
0.2
0.205
0.203
0.206
0.2
0.194
0.194
0.182
0.2
0.181
0.204
0.188
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Table 4.3 Simulated stopping probabilities for frequentist and Bayesian group sequential methods
with a single efficacy boundary. Bayesian type I and II error rates are simulated under three
different prior specifications. It is assumed that 𝑃1 = 0.65 and 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, 𝛼 = 0.05
and 𝛽 = 0.2.

̃
̃
̃
Prior for Treatment Prior for Control 𝑆𝑃
𝑆𝑃
𝑆𝑃
𝐸1
𝐸2
𝐸3
Frequentist Method
0.0402 0.175 0.582
0.040 0.176 0.588
Beta(1, 1)
Beta(1,1)
O’Brien-Fleming
0.0409 0.17 0.580
Beta(13, 7)
Beta(10, 10)
0.0394 0.168 0.598
Beta(5, 15)
Beta(10, 10)
Frequentist Method
0.343 0.139 0.314
0.347 0.138 0.311
Beta(1, 1)
Beta(1,1)
Pocock
0.341 0.15 0.305
Beta(13, 7)
Beta(10, 10)
0.299 0.142 0.361
Beta(5, 15)
Beta(10, 10)
Frequentist Method
0.262 0.168 0.369
0.253 0.169 0.369
Beta(1, 1)
Beta(1,1)
Power, 𝜃 = 1
0.253 0.170 0.366
Beta(13, 7)
Beta(10, 10)
0.269 0.126 0.408
Beta(5, 15)
Beta(10, 10)
Frequentist Method
0.139 0.166 0.487
0.137 0.168 0.5
Beta(1, 1)
Beta(1,1)
Power, 𝜃 = 2
0.149 0.158 0.492
Beta(13, 7)
Beta(10, 10)
0.115 0.201 0.473
Beta(5, 15)
Beta(10, 10)
Boundaries
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Table 4.4 Simulated stopping probabilities for frequentist and Bayesian group sequential methods
with binding double boundaries. Bayesian type I and II error rates are simulated under three
different prior specifications. It is assumed that 𝑃1 = 0.65 and 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, 𝛼 = 0.05
and 𝛽 = 0.2.

Boundaries
O’Brien-Fleming
– O’BrienFleming

O’Brien-Fleming
– Pocock

Pocock –
O’Brien-Fleming

Pocock – Pocock

Prior for
Prior for
Treatment
Control
Frequentist Method
Beta(1, 1)
Beta(1,1)
Beta(13, 7)
Beta(10, 10)
Beta(5, 15)
Beta(10, 10)
Frequentist Method
Beta(1, 1)
Beta(1,1)
Beta(13, 7)
Beta(10, 10)
Beta(5, 15)
Beta(10, 10)
Frequentist Method
Beta(1, 1)
Beta(1,1)
Beta(13, 7)
Beta(10, 10)
Beta(5, 15)
Beta(10, 10)
Frequentist Method
Beta(1, 1)
Beta(1,1)
Beta(13, 7)
Beta(10, 10)
Beta(5, 15)
Beta(10, 10)
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̃
𝑆𝑃
𝐸1

̃
𝑆𝑃
𝐸2

̃
𝑆𝑃
𝐸3

̃
𝑆𝑃
𝐹1

̃
𝑆𝑃
𝐹2

̃
𝑆𝑃
𝐹3

0.304
0.302
0.306
0.303
0.618
0.614
0.619
0.614
0.38
0.386
0.386
0.386
0.613
0.611
0.617
0.610

0.316
0.313
0.345
0.312
0.111
0.111
0.111
0.111
0.283
0.282
0.282
0.28
0.175
0.170
0.173
0.162

0.332
0.335
0.3
0.33
0.221
0.222
0.221
0.222
0.282
0.282
0.282
0.283
0.163
0.162
0.157
0.173

0.0258
0.0264
0.0231
0.022
0.1
0.101
0.101
0.101
0.0264
0.0308
0.0308
0.029
0.0914
0.0826
0.107
0.0819

0.0435
0.0445
0.0563
0.0443
0.0294
0.0305
0.0251
0.0315
0.0403
0.0394
0.0394
0.0386
0.0336
0.0341
0.0349
0.0355

0.135
0.136
0.127
0.116
0.0744
0.0732
0.0768
0.0733
0.128
0.123
0.123
0.118
0.0649
0.0635
0.0616
0.071

Table 4.5 Efficacy stopping boundary values (𝑐𝐸 ), Maximum sample sizes (MSS) and expected
sample sizes (ESS) under the alternative hypothesis for example trial designed with frequentist
and Bayesian group sequential methods with a different number of stages. It is assumed that 𝑃1 =
0.6 and 𝑃2 = 0.4, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, 𝛼 = 0.05 and 𝛽 = 0.15. O’Brien-Fleming type alpha-spending
function are used for determining stopping boundaries.

Bayesian Methods
Frequentist
Methods

Design

Experimental:
Beta(1,1)

Experimental:
Beta(30,10)

Experimental:
Beta(16,24)

Control:
Beta(1,1)

Control:
Beta(20,20)

Control:
Beta(20,20)

Stage 1

2.538

0.994

0.999

0.953

Stage 2

1.662

0.951

0.996

0.802

MSS

174

174

164

176

ESS

152

152

155

168

Stage 1

3.202

0.999

0.999

0.917

Stage 2

2.552

0.994

0.999

0.888

Stage 3

1.662

0.951

0.996

0.806

MSS

174

174

164

176

ESS

150

150

139

152

Stage 1

3.202

0.999

0.999

0.920

Stage 2

2.552

0.994

0.999

0.890

Stage 3

2.179

0.985

0.999

0.865

Stage 4

1.698

0.954

0.996

0.816

MSS

178

178

166

178

ESS

136

136

127

138

𝑐𝐸
Two-Stages

𝑐𝐸
Three-Stages

𝑐𝐸
Four-Stages
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CHAPTER FIVE: SPECIFIC AIM 3
5.1 Introduction
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is a long-time debate between frequentist and Bayesian
clinical trialist on which approach is better. Rather than declaring one to be better than the other,
Bayarri and Berger(Bayarri & Berger, 2004) had acknowledged that frequentist and Bayesian
approaches can both play important roles in clinical trials. In fact, only a few parallel comparisons
are made between frequentist and Bayesian approaches because of a lack of established
correspondence between two paradigms (Inoue et al., 2005; Lewis et al., 2007). To be more
specific, frequentist and Bayesian clinical trialists may claim one paradigm is superior to the other,
however, the targeted operating characteristics of two paradigms are quite different. Additionally,
it should be noticed that many of the ‘frequentist vs Bayesian comparisons were carried out from
the Bayesian clinical trialists’ side while few came from frequentist perspectives. Overall, a fair
comparison should be made between frequentist and Bayesian approaches, while holding the
operating characteristics such as type I and II error rates as the same.
Considering the above issues, two novel unified approaches for frequentist and Bayesian
methods in fixed-sample and group-sequential clinical trials with binary endpoints are proposed
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. The unified approaches allowed Bayesian and frequentist approaches
to generate the same type I and II error rates. For Bayesian approaches, there is no need to adjust
the prior distributions, but Bayesian sample sizes and decision thresholds are calibrated to satisfy
type I and II error rates. Hence, a detailed numerical investigation can be nicely performed to
compare Bayesian and frequentist approaches in the unified framework for different design
parameters, such as Bayesian prior specifications, numbers of analyses, allocation ratios and
stopping boundaries.
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In this chapter, a deep investigation, motivated by a phase III trial for hemorrhagic stroke
is conducted. First, the influences of different prior specifications and design parameters on the
Bayesian maximum and expected sample sizes and decision thresholds are evaluated. Second,
frequentist and Bayesian approaches are studied in a comparable manner. Finally, suggestions for
making a selection between Bayesian and frequentist approaches for specific clinical trial designs
are given. Section 5.2 briefly introduced the methods and Section 5.3 summarizes the results.

5.2 Methods
Consider the same two-arm phase III randomized stroke trial as the one used in a trial application
in Chapter 4. The trial evaluates the superiority of the intensive systolic blood-pressure reduction
treatment compared to the standard systolic blood-pressure reduction treatment after the onset of
the hemorrhagic stroke. The primary endpoint is the proportion who do not have severe disability
or death at 3 months and is binomially distributed. Patients are randomized into two treatment
arms. The type I error rate and power are specified to be 0.05 and 0.85. It is assumed that the
intensive systolic blood-pressure would increase the proportion of patients who satisfy the primary
endpoint by 20%, from 0.4 to 0.6. In addition, it is supposed that there are no covariates or
interaction terms when analyzing the primary endpoint. Originally, the trial is designed using
frequentist approaches. However, it is re-designed and evaluated using Bayesian approaches, in
order to compare Bayesian and frequentist sample sizes and decision thresholds under various
conditions. It is of particular interest to compare Bayesian and frequentist properties with different
prior specifications, allocation ratios, and the number of analyses.
The frequentist methods and Bayesian methods are derived for specific trial parameters
using the unified approaches proposed in Chapter 3 and 4. Trial parameters include the Bayesian
priors, the allocation ratio and the number of analyses. There are many prior elicitation methods
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available, e.g.(Fox, 1966; Gross, 1971; Ibrahim & Chen, 2000; Wu, Shih, & Moore, 2008). An
intuitive approach is used here to specify the prior distribution(Gross, 1971), in which prior mean
centers at the prior belief about the treatment effect. Prior sample size proposed by Morita et al.
(Morita et al., 2012) is used to denote the sum of prior parameters, that is, 𝑎 + 𝑏. The larger the
prior sample size is, the greater effect the prior distribution can exert on the posterior distribution.
To evaluate the effect of prior sample size on Bayesian sample sizes, a range of 𝑎 + 𝑏 values are
considered, while holding 𝑎/(𝑎 + 𝑏) to be fixed.
Notably, prior distributions are categorized into three classes, the non-informative priors,
the optimistic priors (or the enthusiastic priors) and the pessimistic priors (or the skeptical priors),
based on the prior mean (Moatti et al., 2013). The non-informative prior minimizes the influence
of prior on the posterior distribution and let data contributes most to the posterior distribution. The
optimistic prior considers a beneficial treatment effect and the prior mean is greater than or equal
the assumed treatment effect of the intensive systolic blood pressure reduction arm. The
pessimistic prior considers a treatment effect is unlikely to be observed, and the prior mean is no
greater than the assumed treatment effect of the standard systolic blood pressure reduction arm.
In this chapter, influences of Bayesian priors are first evaluated using a 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1) noninformative prior distribution. Then both optimistic and pessimistic priors are applied to the
intensive systolic blood pressure reduction treatment group. Optimistic priors with mean values of
0.8 and 0.6 are considered in the evaluation, while for pessimistic priors, mean values of 0.4 and
0.2 are considered. For the standard treatment group, only pessimistic priors with a prior mean
centered on the null hypothesis, i.e. 𝑎/(𝑎 + 𝑏) = 0.4 are considered.
All evaluations are conducted using a user-friendly software application. The application
has been developed and made accessible online to allow other clinical trialists to use the unified
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framework when designing their clinical trials. PyQt framework is used to develop the frontend of
the application and all algorithms are implemented using Cython. The interface of the application
is presented in Figure 5.1. Users can simply enter the parameters in the input box, click and run
to get the results. Note, the application also supports simulating operating characteristics for
Bayesian multi-arm multi-stage design (Yu et al., 2019) using an optimized algorithm proposed
earlier. Full documentation of the software application can be found on the website
http://usebats.org/bats.

5.3 Results
Bayesian sample sizes and decision thresholds are evaluated for five prior specifications
mentioned above (prior mean of 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2 and the non-informative prior), with informative
prior sample sizes ranging from 10 to 60 by 10. Here, prior sample sizes for the experimental arm
and the control arm are held the same. For simplicity, it is assumed that patients are equally
randomized to the experimental arm and the control arm. Further, assume there are two interim
analyses planned when 1/3 and 1/2 patients are enrolled and only treatment efficacy is assessed at
interim analyses. An O’Brien-Fleming type alpha spending function has been used to derive the
efficacy boundaries. The type I error rate and power are specified to be 0.05 and 0.85, as stated
above. Bayesian maximum sample sizes and expected sample sizes are plotted against the prior
sample sizes in Figure 5.2. Bayesian stopping boundary values are shown in Figure 5.3.
Corresponding frequentist maximum sample sizes, expected sample sizes and stopping boundaries
are also calculated. Complete results are summarized in tables in Table 5.1.
Figure 5.2 displays the trends of Bayesian maximum and expected sample sizes for
corresponding prior sample sizes. The dashed line represents the maximum sample size and the
expected sample size for the 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1) non-informative prior, which coincide with the frequentist
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values. The maximum sample size reduces significantly for the optimistic prior with a mean of
0.8. As the prior sample size 𝑎 + 𝑏 increases from 10 to 60, the maximum sample size decreases
from 170 to 150. Nevertheless, the maximum sample size does not change much for the other
optimistic prior with a mean of 0.6. For two pessimistic priors, the maximum sample sizes are
nearly the same as the maximum sample size for the non-informative prior. Similar patterns are
observed for the expected sample size. The optimistic prior with a mean of 0.8 has the largest
expected sample size reduction, while the other optimistic prior results in a negligible expected
sample size reduction. Expected sample sizes for two pessimistic priors are slightly greater than
that for the non-informative prior.
Notably, stopping boundaries are also adjusted (see Figure 5.3). Stopping boundary values
for optimistic priors are more rigorous than those for the non-informative prior. An optimistic prior
with large prior sample size can produce rigid stopping rules across all stages. Conversely,
stopping boundary values for pessimistic priors decrease as the prior sample size increases, and
are smaller than stopping boundaries for the non-informative prior. Maximum sample size
Next, allocation ratios 𝑟 = 1,2,3 are examined for the five prior specifications, assuming
the same three-stage design with an O’Brien-Fleming efficacy boundary as above. In addition,
consider prior sample sizes of 5, 7.5, 15, 30 and 45 for the intensive systolic blood pressure
reduction group. A prior sample size of 15 is fixed for the standard treatment group. Figure 5.4
and 5.5 present heatmaps of the maximum and expected sample sizes for each prior specification,
the x axis represents the allocation ratios and the y axis represents the prior sample sizes for the
experimental arm. The lighter the color of the cell in the heatmap, the larger the sample size is.
The maximum sample size, expected sample size and stopping boundaries for the non-informative
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prior case and the frequentist approach are summarized in Table 5.2. Complete results including
stopping boundary values are included in Table 5.3.
When non-informative priors are applied to treatment arms, the Bayesian maximum and
expected sample sizes are similar to frequentist values if patients are equally allocated to two
treatment arms (see Table 5.2). However, for unequal allocation ratios, Bayesian maximum and
expected sample sizes are smaller than frequentist values. Stopping boundary values do not change
much with respect to allocation ratio changes. The maximum sample size increases as the
allocation ratio become large. In contrast to the non-informative priors, the maximum sample size
is constantly the smallest for all informative priors when allocation ratio 𝑟 = 2 (see Figure 5.4).
While the maximum sample sizes are roughly the same between 𝑟 = 1 and 𝑟 = 3 the prior sample
size of the experimental arm is smaller than that of the control arm. Notably, the ratio of prior
sample sizes can affect the maximum sample size value. The maximum sample size increases as
the ratio of the prior sample sizes of the experimental arm to the control arm increases.
As such, the expected sample sizes are the smallest for allocation ratio 𝑟 = 2 for all
informative prior. The expected sample sizes for 𝑟 = 3 is slightly smaller than that for 𝑟 = 1.
Compared to frequentist approaches, Bayesian expected sample sizes can be less, equal or more,
depending on the allocation ratio and prior sample size ratio. For equal allocation, Bayesian
expected sample sizes are smaller than frequentist expected sample sizes, when optimistic priors
are used and prior sample sizes of the experimental arm are smaller than those of the control arm.
For 𝑟 = 2, Bayesian expected sample sizes are smaller than frequentist expected sample sizes, as
long as prior sample sizes of the experimental arm are smaller than those of the control arm. While
for 𝑟 =3, the Bayesian expected sample sizes are consistently smaller than the frequentist expected
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sample sizes. Results indicates the allocation ratio, as well as the ratio of prior sample sizes, can
influence the Bayesian sample sizes.
Further, the influences of the number of analyses on Bayesian maximum and expected
sample sizes are assessed. Assume that patients are equally randomized into two treatment arms
and the prior sample sizes are set to 30 for both treatment arms. The same type I and II error rates
as above are used. Multiple numbers of analyses ranging from 1 to 6 are evaluated. Further, it is
assumed that there is equal spacing between two scheduled analyses and O’Brien-Fleming efficacy
boundary is used. Figure 5.6 shows the Bayesian maximum and expected sample sizes plotted
against a various number of analyses. Note, planning only one analysis leads to a fixed-sample
one-stage trial. Hence, the expected sample size is reported as the maximum sample size.
Corresponding frequentist maximum sample sizes, expected sample sizes and stopping boundaries
are also derived. Complete results are summarized in tables in Table 5.4.
From the results, it can be found that the Bayesian maximum sample size increases as the
number of analyses increases, while the expected sample size becomes smaller when there are
more interim analyses. Bayesian maximum and expected sample sizes are close to frequentist
values when non-informative prior is used. Similar to results of evaluations for prior sample sizes,
applying optimistic priors lead to smaller maximum and expected sample sizes than corresponding
frequentist sample sizes, whereas pessimistic prior lead to larger sample size values.

5.4. Conclusion
The Bayesian-frequentist debate in clinical trials has been there for a long time (Efron, 2005; David
J Spiegelhalter, Freedman, & Parmar, 1994b). For Bayesian methods, the use of subjective
Bayesian priors is also of concern to some clinical trialists. Rather than making assertive
statements on problems, like which statistical paradigm is better, or whether Bayesian prior
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information is good or not, this chapter focuses on evaluating these problems under different
circumstances. An investigation is present to assess Bayesian prior influences on the maximum
and expected sample sizes, decision thresholds, with varying prior sample sizes, allocation ratios
and number of analyses. Meanwhile, comparisons between sample sizes of Bayesian approaches
and sample sizes of corresponding frequentist approaches are made. The comparisons are objective
because compared Bayesian and frequentist methods lead to the same conclusions.
Results show that selection of different Bayesian priors, prior sample sizes, allocation
ratios and a number of analyses can change Bayesian maximum and expected sample sizes.
Comparisons between Bayesian and frequentist results show that when non-informative priors are
applied to treatment arms in Bayesian approaches, resulting in maximum and expected sample
sizes are the same as frequentist values for most cases. Lewis et al. (Lewis et al., 2007) made a
similar conclusion in a previous paper, but the authors compared a Bayesian decision-theoretical
approach with the classical frequentist approach. Only exceptions are when unequal allocation
ratios are used, indicating that Bayesian methods may be beneficial for sample size reduction in
clinical trials with unequal allocations.
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5.5 Appendix
Figure 5.1 The interface of the software application.
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Figure 5.2 Bayesian maximum and expected sample sizes with respect to prior sample sizes. Light
blue dashed lines represent the maximum and expected sample sizes when non-informative prior
is used.
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Figure 5.3 Bayesian stopping boundary (decision threshold) value at each stage for different
prior sample sizes. Light blue dashed lines represent stopping boundary values when noninformative prior is used.
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Figure 5.4. Bayesian maximum sample sizes with different allocation ratios and prior sample
sizes for the intensive systolic blood pressure reduction treatment.
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Figure 5.5. Bayesian expected sample sizes with different allocation ratios and prior sample
sizes for the intensive systolic blood pressure reduction treatment.
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Figure 5.6. Bayesian maximum and expected sample sizes with respect to the number of analyses.
Light blue dashed lines represent the maximum and expected sample sizes when non-informative
prior is used.
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Table 5.1 Complete results of maximum sample size (MSS), expected sample size (ESS) and
decision thresholds for Bayesian methods when changing Bayesian prior sample sizes. Values for
frequentist approaches are also reported.
Stopping Boundaries
Prior Mean

Prior
Sample
Size

MSS

ESS

10

170

20

Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

144

0.999

0.998

0.984

166

140

0.999

0.999

0.995

30

162

136

0.999

0.999

0.998

40

158

132

0.999

0.999

0.999

50

154

129

0.999

0.999

0.999

60

150

125

0.999

0.999

0.999

10

172

147

0.999

0.996

0.969

20

171

146

0.999

0.997

0.979

30

170

145

0.999

0.998

0.986

40

170

145

0.999

0.998

0.991

50

170

145

0.999

0.999

0.994

60

169

144

0.999

0.999

0.996

10

174

150

0.997

0.988

0.942

20
30
40
50
60
10
20

175
175
175
175
175
175
176

150
151
151
151
151
151
152

0.993
0.988
0.982
0.975
0.967
0.991
0.956

0.981
0.974
0.966
0.957
0.949
0.971
0.918

0.933
0.924
0.916
0.907
0.9
0.901
0.83

30

175

151

0.882

0.83

0.741

40

175

151

0.771

0.717

0.641

50

174

149

0.629

0.593

0.536

60

173

148

0.496

0.471

0.433

Non-informative Prior

173

148

0.999

0.993

0.95

Frequentist

173

148

3.202

2.552

1.662

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2
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Table 5.2 The maximum and expected sample sizes and decision thresholds for the Bayesian
approach with non-informative priors and the corresponding frequentist approach, evaluating with
different allocation ratios.
Allocation Ratio
𝑟=1

Parameter

𝑐𝐸

𝑟=2

𝑟=3

Bayesian

Frequentist

Bayesian

Frequentist

Bayesian

Frequentist

Stage 1

0.999

3.202

0.999

3.202

0.999

3.202

Stage 2

0.993

2.552

0.993

2.552

0.992

2.552

Stage 3

0.950

1.662

0.948

1.662

0.947

1.662

MSS

174

174

192

197

222

232

ESS

148

150

163

168

189

200
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Table 5.3 Complete results of maximum and expected sample sizes and decision thresholds for
Bayesian methods when changing allocation ratios and prior sample sizes for the experimental
arm. Values for frequentist approaches are also reported.
Prior Sample
Size for the
Experimental
Arm

Prior Mean

Allocation Ratio (The experimental arm to the control)
1:1
MSS

5

ESS

2:1

Stopping Boundaries
Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

MSS

ESS

3:1

Stopping Boundaries
Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

MSS

ESS

Stopping Boundaries
Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

0.8

153

128

0.999

0.996

0.971

148

121

0.999

0.994

0.961

154

124

0.998

0.991

0.954

0.6

155

130

0.998

0.993

0.958

148

122

0.998

0.99

0.95

154

124

0.997

0.987

0.943

0.4

156

132

0.997

0.988

0.942

149

123

0.996

0.985

0.936

155

126

0.994

0.982

0.931

0.2

157

133

0.994

0.98

0.921

150

124

0.993

0.978

0.92

155

126

0.991

0.975

0.917

0.8

157

131

0.999

0.997

0.978

152

125

0.999

0.996

0.969

158

128

0.998

0.994

0.962

0.6

159

134

0.999

0.994

0.963

153

127

0.998

0.992

0.955

160

130

0.997

0.989

0.948

0.4

161

137

0.997

0.987

0.941

155

129

0.995

0.984

0.936

161

131

0.994

0.981

0.931

0.2

162

138

0.991

0.973

0.908

155

129

0.99

0.972

0.911

162

132

0.988

0.969

0.909

0.8

168

142

0.999

0.999

0.991

165

137

0.999

0.998

0.984

174

142

0.999

0.997

0.978

0.6

172

147

0.999

0.996

0.975

168

141

0.998

0.994

0.966

176

145

0.998

0.992

0.96

0.4

174

150

0.995

0.985

0.938

169

142

0.994

0.983

0.934

178

147

0.993

0.98

0.931

0.2

176

152

0.978

0.949

0.868

170

144

0.979

0.954

0.883

178

148

0.978

0.954

0.888

0.8

189

162

0.999

0.999

0.998

189

160

0.999

0.999

0.995

202

169

0.999

0.999

0.991

0.6

196

171

0.999

0.998

0.987

194

166

0.999

0.997

0.98

205

172

0.999

0.996

0.974

0.4

199

174

0.994

0.983

0.934

196

169

0.993

0.981

0.933

206

174

0.992

0.98

0.931

0.2

201

177

0.942

0.888

0.781

197

170

0.954

0.917

0.828

207

175

0.957

0.925

0.846

0.8

208

182

0.999

0.999

0.999

211

182

0.999

0.999

0.998

226

192

0.999

0.999

0.996

0.6

218

193

0.999

0.999

0.993

217

188

0.999

0.998

0.987

230

197

0.999

0.997

0.982

0.4

222

197

0.994

0.982

0.932

220

192

0.993

0.981

0.933

232

199

0.992

0.98

0.931

0.2

222

197

0.9

0.827

0.696

220

192

0.929

0.877

0.775

233

200

0.938

0.897

0.807

Non-informative

174

148

0.999

0.993

0.95

192

163

0.999

0.993

0.948

222

189

0.999

0.992

0.947

Frequentist

174

150

3.202

2.552

1.662

197

168

3.202

2.552

1.662

232

200

3.202

2.552

1.662

7.5

15

30

45
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Table 5.4 Complete results of maximum and expected sample sizes and decision thresholds for
Bayesian methods when changing number of analyses. Values for frequentist approaches are also
reported.
Number of
Analyses

Prior Mean

1

0.8

162

0.6

170

0.4

2

3

4

5

6

MSS

ESS

Stopping Boundaries
Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

Stage 4

Stage 5

Stage 6

162

0.999

-

-

-

-

-

170

0.986

-

-

-

-

-

176

176

0.923

-

-

-

-

-

0.2

176

176

0.738

-

-

-

-

-

Non-informative Prior

174

174

0.949

-

-

-

-

-

Frequentist

174

174

1.64

-

-

-

-

-

0.8

162

139

0.999

0.998

-

-

-

-

0.6

171

148

0.998

0.986

-

-

-

-

0.4

175

153

0.975

0.925

-

-

-

-

0.2

176

154

0.836

0.741

-

-

-

-

Non-informative Prior

174

152

0.993

0.95

-

-

-

-

Frequentist

174

151

2.538

1.662

-

-

-

-

0.8

164

131

0.999

0.999

0.998

-

-

-

0.6

173

140

0.999

0.995

0.987

-

-

-

0.4

178

144

0.988

0.96

0.929

-

-

-

0.2

178

145

0.883

0.803

0.752

-

-

-

Non-informative Prior

176

143

0.999

0.982

0.953

-

-

-

Frequentist

176

152

3.202

2.142

1.694

-

-

-

0.8

165

126

0.999

0.999

0.999

0.999

-

-

0.6

174

134

0.999

0.998

0.994

0.988

-

-

0.4

179

139

0.993

0.976

0.954

0.932

-

-

0.2

180

140

0.905

0.84

0.794

0.761

-

-

Non-informative Prior

177

137

0.999

0.993

0.977

0.956

-

-

Frequentist

178

137

3.75

2.54

2.016

1.72

-

-

0.8

166

123

0.999

0.999

0.999

0.999

0.999

-

0.6

175

131

0.999

0.999

0.997

0.993

0.988

-

0.4

181

137

0.995

0.984

0.968

0.951

0.934

-

0.2

182

138

0.923

0.866

0.824

0.792

0.768

-

Non-informative Prior

178

134

0.999

0.997

0.988

0.974

0.957

-

Frequentist

179

134

4.229

2.889

2.298

1.962

1.74

-

0.8

166

121

0.999

0.999

0.999

0.999

0.999

0.999

0.6

176

130

0.999

0.999

0.998

0.996

0.993

0.989

0.4

181

134

0.997

0.989

0.976

0.963

0.949

0.936

0.2

182

135

0.937

0.884

0.846

0.815

0.791

0.772

Non-informative Prior

179

133

0.999

0.999

0.994

0.984

0.972

0.959

Frequentist

180

132

4.655

3.202

2.552

2.179

1.934

1.755
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we develop two unified approaches for frequentist and Bayesian
hypothesis tests in two-arm fixed-sample and group-sequential superiority trials with binary
endpoints. We assume the Bayesian prior follows a conjugated beta distribution and the Bayesian
test is based on the posterior probability of rate difference. The idea of the proposed approaches
for unifying frequentist and Bayesian methods is new and much improved compared to other
proposed methodologies (Shi & Yin, 2019; Zhu & Yu, 2015). First, proposed unified approaches
took Bayesian prior distributions into sample size and decision threshold determinations. As
different priors can influence stopping boundaries and sample size and resulting type I and II error
rates, taking the Bayesian prior into account controls type I and II error rates at the desired level.
Second, a theoretical approach to determine Bayesian sample sizes and decision thresholds are
provided, which does not require any simulation is very quick to compute. Last, varying binding
and non-binding futility boundary were considered in the unified approach in Chapter 4, which
was assumed to be constant(Zhu & Yu, 2015), or ignored(Shi & Yin, 2019) in previous work.
Results from Chapter 3 and 4 show that type I and II error rates are consistently matched
for all analyses, regardless of the Bayesian priors used. Frequentist and Bayesian methods differ
philosophically, however, this dissertation shows that these two methods can be unified
methodologically in group sequential trials, which can serve as a cornerstone of statistical analysis
in clinical trials. The unified approach also lowers the entry for clinical trialists to use Bayesian
methods in clinical trials, because the approach is developed using relationships commonly seen
in classical clinical trials. A further investigation in Chapter 5 demonstrates that Bayesian prior
specifications, as well as prior sample size, allocation ratio and the number of analyses planned in
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clinical trials, can affect the final trial samples sizes. Therefore, frequentist and Bayesian methods
can outperform each other under specific circumstances. It is suggested for clinical trialists to use
the proposed unified framework at the trial planning stage to help make appropriate decisions on
choosing Bayesian or frequentist approaches.

6.2 Future Work
There are several limitations to this dissertation. First, only binary endpoints are considered
in this dissertation, while other regular endpoints, such as normal outcomes and time-to-event, are
not discussed. Second, the methods currently are restricted to clinical trials with two samples,
although proposed unified approaches have the potential to be extended to multi-arm multi-stage
clinical trials. Last, the normal approximation to the transformed posterior probability might not
be accurate if the posterior probability is extremely high (e.g. 0.9999999), as the distribution of
posterior probability will be truncated at the upper boundary of one.
Thus, we aim to tackle these limitations in the future through corresponding improvements.
First, proposed unified approaches will be extended to clinical trials with normal and time-to-event
endpoints. Whether the same type I and II error rates can be achieved will also be evaluated.
Second, a multiplicity adjustment procedure will be incorporated into the unified approaches, to
account for multiple comparisons in multi-arm clinical trials. Last, a truncated normal
approximation will be developed to approximate the truncated posterior probability distribution.
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